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ABSTRACT
CHOOSING TO SERVE: UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARY
PARTICIPATION DECISION
David R. Mann
Kenneth I. Wolpin
With 2.4 million employees, the military is America’s largest employer. Individ-
uals make the military labor force participation decision within the context of other
labor market opportunities, which may vary by race and over the business cycle.
This paper develops and estimates a dynamic discrete choice model of lifetime career
decision making that incorporates military options. In the model, forward-looking
individuals receive wage offers from the civilian and military sectors and decide
whether to work in the civilian sector, attend school, stay home, serve active duty
military, or serve reserve duty military. The model describes the military’s com-
pensation structure and recruitment policies in detail and introduces business cycle
effects that affect civilian labor market opportunities. The model is estimated by
simulated maximum likelihood using data on males from the NLSY79. Parameter
estimates reveal that the civilian sector places a high premium on civilian expe-
rience relative to military experience. The model fits well military participation
patterns and dynamics, including by race and over the business cycle. The model
is used to perform experiments that alter the military compensation and promotion
structure. Results indicate that military participation is highly elastic with respect
vi
to changes in the wage rate. Other experiments reveal that blacks’ participation
in the military drops dramatically as the racial wage gap in the civilian sector de-
creases. Experiments that alter the length and severity of business cycles result in
military participation rate effects that range from 3% to 6%.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With a fiscal year 2008 personnel budget of $114 billion and 2.4 million employees,
the United States military is America’s largest employer.1 Each year the military
adds approximately 200,000 new recruits, who on average are 18 to 20 years old
at time of enlistment and serve about six years. Men comprised 91.6% of military
recruits in 1980 and 85% of recruits in 2002. 2 The military recruits this workforce
despite paying an average entry level wage that is 12% lower than the average 18
year old’s civilian sector wage.
Individuals are motivated to join the military for different reasons. Some in-
dividuals join because they are endowed with abilities that provide them with a
comparative advantage in military service. There is evidence that blacks join the
1Figure A.1 reports total annual military spending from 1947 through 2004. From the Center
for Defense Information.
2Population Reference Bureau (2004), Department of Defense (2008), Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (2010)
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military at relatively high rates because the civilian sector usually offers them a
wage that is lower than the wage offered to whites.3 When compared to whites,
blacks are 33% more likely to join the military.
The military participation decision is also affected by macroeconomic conditions.
When the economy is expanding, military recruitment and retention suffer. For ex-
ample, the military retention rate during late 1990s - a time of economic expansion
- was low enough to convince Congress to approve in 2000 a significant pay increase
for experienced military personnel.4 During recessions, however, recruitment and
retention thrive. The Department of Defense reported that fiscal year 2009 - a year
of sharp economic contraction - was its most successful recruitment year since con-
scription ended in 1973.5
The discussion above generates several research questions. First, to what extent
does the civilian sector value military experience? Second, how do the military
participation rate and average military career length change as military wages are
altered? Third, instead of increasing retention by increasing the military wages of
experienced personnel as Congress did in 2000, what would have happened if the
military had instead increased the promotion probabilities of experienced person-
nel?6 Fourth, how do the military participation rate and average military career
length change among blacks as racial differences are removed from civilian sector
3Kane (1994); Laurence (1992); Moskos & Butler (1996)
4Asch et al. (2002)
5United States Army (2009)
6Buddin et al. (1992)
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wage offers? Fifth, does removing the education attainment gap at age 18 between
whites and blacks significantly decrease black military participation? Sixth, to what
extent does the business cycle drive military participation?
To examine the research questions above, this study develops and estimates a
dynamic discrete choice model of lifetime career decision making that incorporates
various military options.7 The model assumes that starting at age 18 and ending
at age 65, individuals annually receive wage offers from the civilian and military
sectors and then make a decision regarding whether to work in the civilian sector,
attend school, stay home, serve active duty military, serve part-time in the reserve
military and work in the civilian sector, or serve part-time in the reserve military
and stay home.8 Individuals are forward-looking and make decisions taking into
account the expected future impact on earnings opportunities. When making their
sector participation decisions, individuals face uncertainty regarding future wage
and preference shocks.
The model captures in detail important features of the military’s compensation
structure and recruitment policies. In accordance with the military’s recruitment
policies, the model prohibits some individuals who perform poorly on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test, or AFQT, from joining the military. Military wages are
a function of pay grade (i.e., rank) and military experience, which both evolve en-
dogenously. Promotion is modeled as a probabilistic event conditioned on current
7Several models have solved problems of this type, including Eckstein & Wolpin (1999).
8Reservists typically serve one weekend a month as well as an additional two weeks during the
year.
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pay grade and military experience. Minimum experience thresholds must be met in
order to be considered for promotion. Eligible veterans receive pension payments,
which begin either at age 60 or upon leaving the military.
The model also incorporates business cycle effects, which are known to be im-
portant to sector participation decisions. Specifically, individuals who enter the
civilian workforce after an absence pay a job search cost that varies by the business
cycle state. A Markov chain describes the transition probabilities between business
cycle states.
To enrich individual heterogeneity within the model, it is assumed that there
exists within the data a finite mixture of unobserved types.9 Skill and preference
endowments vary across types. The probability of being a certain type is a function
of observable characteristics such as race.
In addition to racial differences in type probabilities, the model allows civilian
sector wage offers to vary further by race. Since this additional variation can be
attributed to civilian sector racial discrimination and it is assumed that the military
cannot discriminate, military sector wage offers are not allowed to vary further by
race.
The model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using male data from
the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, or NLSY79. In addition to con-
taining a nationally representative sample, the NLSY79 includes a military over-
sample, which is comprised of individuals who were serving active duty in 1979.
9Types are multinomial, as in Heckman & Singer (1984).
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The sample used for the analysis is a weighted combination of the nationally rep-
resentative sample and military over-sample. In addition to including data on age,
race, education attainment, civilian labor force experience and civilian earnings, the
NLSY79 contains military data, including AFQT score, military pay grade, mili-
tary labor force experience, and military earnings. The NLSY79’s inclusion of pay
grade, military experience, and military earnings data makes detailed estimation
of the military wage structure possible. The model fits well military participation
patterns and dynamics, including by race and over the business cycle.
The estimated model is informative about the key mechanisms driving military
participation over the life cycle. Individuals endowed with the highest military skills
are not the most likely to join the military. Rather, individuals endowed with high
military skills relative to their other skill endowments are most likely to join the
military. The civilian sector search cost rises as the business cycle state worsens,
which incentivizes military participation when aggregate economic conditions de-
teriorate. Relative to whites, civilian sector wage offers are lower on average for
blacks. Facing relatively lower civilian sector wage offers, blacks are more likely
to accept military wage offers, which do not vary directly by race. The civilian
sector places a high premium on civilian sector experience over military experience,
which helps to explain why on average veterans earn less in the civilian sector than
individuals who never serve in the military.
The estimated model is used to conduct several counterfactual experiments that
5
explore the research questions above. A set of experiments alters military pay by
varying degrees and shows that military participation is highly elastic with respect
to changes in the wage rate. A 1% increase in military pay increases the military
participation rate by about 5%. While the military participation rate increases sig-
nificantly as military wages increase, the average military career length experiences
a more modest increase in response to higher military wages. The military pay
experiments also reveal that, when compared to individuals already serving in the
military, the recruits attracted by the higher military wage are less likely to have
an AFQT score in the lowest quartile. Since individuals with an AFQT score in the
lowest quartile are viewed by the military as the least desirable recruits, increasing
military wages improves the proportion of desirable recruits in the military.
To understand what would have happened to average military career length
if the military had increased promotion probabilities in 2000 instead of increas-
ing military wages, two experiments are conducted. The first experiment increases
promotion probabilities for all experienced military personnel. The experiment re-
sults in an 18% increase in average military career length. The second experiment
increases promotion probabilities for all experienced military personnel who have
completed at least one year of college. The experiment results in a 3% increase in
average military career length. The military participation rate in both experiments
does not change.
Some experiments attempt to understand to what extent racial differences in
6
civilian wage offers are responsible for the relatively high military participation rate
of blacks. In one experiment, the racial difference in civilian sector skills or human
capital rental rate is removed. As a result, the black military participation rate
decreases by 38%. Another experiment changes the education attainment distribu-
tion of blacks to match the education attainment distribution of whites. Altering
the education attainment distribution of blacks alters their civilian sector human
capital, which affects the civilian sector wage offers they receive. The second ex-
periment decreases the black military participation rate by 32%.
The final experiments investigate to what extent business cycle fluctuations af-
fect military participation. An experiment removes business cycle fluctuations from
the model and results in a 6% decrease in the military participation rate, which
suggests that military participation is more sensitive to poor business cycle states
than to good business cycle states. To determine to what extent experiencing a
single poor business cycle state early in life affects the military participation rate,
another experiment forces all individuals to experience the poor business cycle state
at age 18 followed by no business cycle variation. The experiment results in a 13%
increase in the military participation rate.
1.1 Related Literature
Several publications have examined various military labor force topics. Some publi-
cations, including Teachman & Call (1996); Angrist (1998); Hirsh & Mehay (2003),
7
examine the effect military experience has on civilian wages. Among these publica-
tions, Angrist (1998) and Hirsh & Mehay (2003) stand out because both control for
selection into the military. Hirsh & Mehay (2003) conduct a matched comparison
between military reservists who are called to active duty and military reservists
who never serve active duty. Using military and Social Security Administration
data, Angrist (1998) controls for selection into the military by comparing veterans
to military applicants who did not enlist as well as by creating an instrument using
cohorts of veterans who entered the military when the military entrance examina-
tion was misnormed. These two publications find that for enlisted personnel, white
military veterans earn less in the civilian sector than whites who never enlist. Black
veterans earn slightly more than blacks who never enlist. While these two studies
discover that on average being a veteran adversely affects civilian wages, both can
only speculate regarding the mechanism that generates this earnings disparity.
A few publications have examined the decision to join the military. Hosek &
Peterson (1985b) use a Department of Defense survey and the NLSY79 for data and
find that the enlistment behavior of high school seniors and high school graduates
are substantially different. Kilburn & Klerman (1999) use the National Educa-
tional Longitudinal Study sample to characterize military enlistment during the
1990s. Kleykamp (2006) studies how education goals, familiarity with the military,
and socioeconomic factors influence the decision to join the military. Using data
from the Texas high school graduates in 2002, Kleykamp (2006) surprisingly finds
8
few racial and ethnic differences in enlistment behavior and concludes that college
aspirations, living in a community with a high military presence, and low socioeco-
nomic status promote military enlistment.
This study’s features incorporate the findings of previous military participation
studies. Consistent with Hosek & Peterson (1985b), in this study military partic-
ipation incentives vary by education attainment. More specifically, in the model
both the cost associated with attending school and the probability of qualifying for
military service vary by high school diploma status. Contrary to Kleykamp (2006)
and consistent with Kilburn & Klerman (1999) and most other studies’ findings,
this study includes racial differences in endowment and wage offers that allow mil-
itary participation tradeoffs to vary by race.
Several publications have studied military retention, which is also referred to
as the stay or leave decision. Methodological approaches vary widely among these
publications and include (among others) panel probit models (Goldberg & Warner
(1982); Black et al. (1987, 1990)), conditional logit models (Warner (1982)), and
multinomial logit models (Hosek & Peterson (1985a); Lakani & Gilroy (1986)). Also
included among these publications is Enns et al. (1984), which develops the widely
used annualized cost of leaving, or ACOL, model.10 These publications report many
10According to Goldberg (2001), the ACOL model models the military retention decision as a
decision between two discounted pay streams. The projected military pay stream a serviceman
would receive if he re-enlists is collapsed into a discounted present value. The discounted military
pay stream is then compared to the projected civilian pay stream the serviceman would receive if
he leaves the military. This comparison is done over a finite time horizon and results in a retention
probability that can be easily modeled as a probit or logit function.
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findings and often include a military wage elasticity. The samples for these stud-
ies vary substantially. Consequently, the military retention wage elasticities these
publications report vary widely from under a percent to just under 4%. 11
In the past 30 years, two studies have structurally estimated models that ex-
plore military retention. Gotz & McCall (1983) construct a retention model for
Air Force officers. Among the first publications to structurally estimate a model,
Gotz & McCall (1983) incorporates into the model various factors that influence
the retention decision, including “promotion probabilities and timing, regular force
integration probabilities, and mandatory separation and retirement probabilities.”
After estimating three parameters, Gotz & McCall (1983) perform counterfactual
experiments that replicate the recommendations of a presidential commission on
military compensation. Daula & Moffitt (1995) construct a retention model for
Army enlistees and simulate behavior under the Army’s Voluntary Separation In-
centive program. Both papers use military data sets, study decision making after
enlistment, focus on a specific service branch, and assume military retirees cannot
exit the civilian labor force.
As described above, many previous military studies focus on military retention.
While important, the stay or leave decision is not the only military decision individ-
uals make. Before deciding whether to leave the military, individuals must decide
whether to join the military. As Angrist (1998) and Hirsh & Mehay (2003) suggest,
the military entry decision is very important as it has implications for future civilian
11Goldberg (2001) provides an excellent summary of these publications.
10
sector earnings. Furthermore, individuals who decide to serve reserve duty receive
a low military wage but can also join the civilian workforce, while those who decide
to serve active duty receive a high military wage but cannot join the civilian work-
force. Given the importance of and tradeoffs associated with these decisions, this
study models the military entry and service type decisions as well as the military
retention decision.
In addition to including the military entry and service type decisions, the model
presented in this study incorporates many additional features not found in Gotz
& McCall (1983) and Daula & Moffitt (1995). First, this model allows military
retirees to annually choose whether to work in the civilian sector or stay home,
creating a choice set rather than assuming military retirees are always employed.
Second, to show how policy changes would impact the entire military labor force,
this study models the military participation decision across service branches. Third,
to account for a factor that may heavily influence military participation, the study
models the business cycle and how it impacts individuals’ decisions. Finally, this
model takes advantage of computational and methodological advancements over the
past few decades to estimate a model whose complexity would have made it difficult
to estimate in the past.
The model’s structure is similar to that of Keane & Wolpin (1997) in that in-
dividuals can, among other choices, join the military. But the military is not the
focus of Keane & Wolpin (1997). Consequently, Keane & Wolpin (1997) do not
11
include military pay grade and military experience (the determinants of military
human capital), do not distinguish between active duty and reserve duty military
service, and do not restrict military enlistment on the basis of high school diploma
or AFQT score. Furthermore, Keane & Wolpin (1997) use a sample restricted to
white males, do not model the business cycle, do not model military pensions, and
do not perform any military experiments.
12
Chapter 2
Military
In order to model the military participation decision, it is necessary to understand
how the military screens, promotes, and compensates its personnel. In 1973 the
military ended conscription, becoming an all volunteer force. Consequently, all in-
dividuals who join the military must choose to do so.
When joining the military, individuals may serve either active duty or reserve
duty. Individuals serving active duty make military service their full-time job.1
Those serving reserve duty, however, are required to serve only one weekend per
month as well as an additional two weeks per year. Reservists may be called to
active duty by order of the President or in some cases a state governor. No military
experience is required to join either duty type (e.g., an individual does not have
to first serve active duty in order to become a reservist). The military imposes a
1Figure A.2 reports active duty force size from 1950 through 2007. From the Department of
Defense.
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maximum recruitment age in the mid to late 30s and a mandatory retirement age
in the late 50s to early 60s. 2
Before qualifying for military service, individuals take a series of tests known
as the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT) score is calculated from a subset of the ASVAB. By law
the military cannot recruit individuals with an AFQT score in the lowest decile and
only 25% of recruits may have an AFQT score in the second and third deciles. To
qualify for military service, high school dropouts must have an AFQT score that
exceeds a cutoff value. The AFQT cutoff value is usually around the median, varies
by service branch, and varies over time.
The military uses pay grades or ranks to form its personnel hierarchy. The
military has three rank classes: commissioned officers, warrant officers, and en-
listed personnel. Commissioned officers receive their authority from a presidential
commission, while warrant officers initially receive their authority from a warrant
issued by the military. Commissioned officers outrank warrant officers and warrant
officers outrank enlisted personnel. Commissioned officer pay grades are denoted
O1-O10, warrant officer pay grades are denoted W1-W5, and enlisted pay grades
are denoted E1-E9. Enlisted pay grades E5-E9 are reserved for enlisted personnel
with some command authority. Individuals holding an enlisted pay grade of E5 or
higher are known as non-commissioned officers. About 85% of military personnel
have an enlisted pay grade.
2Maximum enlistment age and mandatory retirement age vary over time and by service branch.
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Promotion criteria for enlisted personnel vary by pay grade. For the lowest four
pay grades, promotion is primarily a function of current pay grade and military
experience, though performance plays a minor role. For non-commissioned officers,
however, promotion is a function of position availability, performance, military ex-
perience, and experience in current pay grade. Servicemen must have a minimum
amount of military experience - which varies by pay grade - to be considered for
promotion. Figure A.3 reports the active duty enlisted rank distribution by service
branch for 2007. 3
Pecuniary military compensation can be thought of as containing two compo-
nents. The first and largest component of compensation - comprising on average
over 90% of active duty pecuniary compensation - is base pay. The amount of base
pay a serviceman receives is a function of his pay grade and military experience.
Although base pay is adjusted annually by the Employment Cost Index, servicemen
know with virtual certainty next year’s base pay. Most servicemen, however, receive
more than just base pay. Whether it be an enlistment bonus, combat pay, or extra
pay associated with some other responsibility, this remainder is difficult to predict
as it varies substantially year to year and person to person.
Individuals with at least 20 years of military service are eligible for a pension.
The pension payments’ size and starting date depend on the serviceman’s active
duty experience, reserve duty experience, retirement points, and pay grade. If active
duty experience is at least 20 years, then pension payments begin upon retirement
3Defense Manpower Requirements Report, Department of Defense (2006)
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from the military. But if military experience is at least 20 years and active duty
experience is less than 20 years, then pension payments begin sometime between
age 55 and age 60. Active and reserve duty experience determines how many retire-
ment points a serviceman accumulates. A year of active duty earns 365 retirement
points, while on average a year of reserve duty earns 77 retirement points.4 The
more retirement points earned during a career, the greater the eventual pension
payment.
4Average annual reservist retirement point total based on information provided by Jeffrey
Marmorstein, Operations Research Analyst, US Army Human Resources Command.
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Chapter 3
Model
The model describes a man’s career decision problem.1 Each decision period the
man receives civilian and military wage offers, which are determined by his civilian
and military human capital. After receiving wage offers and preference shocks,
the man, who is forward looking and utility maximizing, chooses which sector or
sectors to participate in. As the man works in the civilian or military sector, he
accumulates sector-specific human capital. The man can also accumulate human
capital by acquiring education. The utility a man receives from entering or re-
entering the civilian labor force depends on the realized business cycle state as well
as his civilian sector wage. The following sections describe the model in detail.
1Including women in the model would increase computational complexity as it would require
the inclusion of the female fertility decision. Furthermore, while women are eligible to join the
military, over 90% of military participants in the data are male. For these reasons it was decided
to exclude women from the model.
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3.1 Primitives and Behavior
In the model, time is discrete. A decision period corresponds to an academic year
(July 1 through June 31). Men begin making decisions at age 18. Decisions are
made over a finite horizon with age 65 being the terminal period A. Let a denote
a man’s age.
3.1.1 Choice Set
Each decision period the man must choose which sector or sectors to participate in.
The choice set includes six mutually exclusive options K = {c, s, at, h, cr, hr}. He
may either work in the civilian sector c, attend school s, serve active duty military
at, or stay home h. If an individual works in the civilian sector or stays home, he
may also serve reserve duty military (cr or hr, respectively.) When a man joins
the military in the model, he can only join the military’s enlisted ranks. He cannot
become a commissioned or warrant officer.2
In addition to the six options above, attending school and serving reserve duty
military is a plausible choice and consequently was considered for inclusion in the
choice set. However, in the data no one makes that choice. For this reason attending
school and serving reserve duty military is excluded from the choice set.
2This restriction was imposed due to data limitations. See the appendix for more details.
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3.1.2 Preferences
The man receives a utility reward from the choice he makes each decision period.
If a man chooses k for the decision period corresponding to age a, he receives the
reward function Rk(Sa), where Sa is the man’s state space at age a.
The man’s reward for working in the civilian sector is a wage wca plus a non-
pecuniary component. The wage, which reflects the man’s human capital, is given
at age a by:
wca = r
c exp{β0,c + β1,cga + β2,cχca + β3,cχma + β4,χca2 + β5,cχcaχma + εca}
where rc is the civilian human capital rental rate, β0,c is a skill endowment, ga is
education attainment or highest grade level completed, χca is civilian experience, χ
m
a
is military experience, and εca is a skill shock.
If a man did not work in the civilian sector last period, he then must pay a
search cost for receiving a wage offer from the civilian sector. The cost’s magnitude
is determined by which business cycle state is realized that period. Higher search
costs are associated with more difficulty finding a wage offer. Difficulty finding a
wage offer, in turn, is positively correlated with the current business cycle’s severity.3
Let dka equal one if a man chooses k and age a and zero otherwise. The reward
function for working in the civilian sector is the sum of the wage and search cost:
Rc(Sa) = w
c
a + β(1− dca−1)
∑
j
βj1ja
3Kydland & Prescott (1982)
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where ja is the business cycle state.
If a man serves in the military, he receives a military wage. As stated previously,
the military wage is base pay plus a remainder. To allow this remainder to vary by
pay grade, military experience and relative to base pay, military wages are modeled
as the following:
wla = base(pga, χ
m
a ) · rl · exp{β0,l + β1,lpga + β2,lχma + εla}
where pga is pay grade, ε
l
a is a skill shock, and l = {at, r}. Notice that unlike the
civilian sector, the military only values human capital that is obtained while in the
military.
If a man serves active duty, his reward function consists of an active duty military
wage as well as a non-pecuniary reward or cost:
Rat(Sa) = βat + w
at
a
The utility obtained or lost from receiving tuition benefits, receiving health benefits,
being deployed, etc. is included in the active duty non-pecuniary reward or cost.4
If a man serves reserve duty, he then receives the reward for what he did in the
civilian sector - either working or staying home - as well as the reserve duty military
4It has been suggested that the model should incorporate a disutility associated with dying
in combat. That is not necessary, however, because servicemen during the late 1970s and early
1980s were unlikely to think that they would die from combat. From 1980 through 2000, which
includes the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, less than 1% of all military deaths were due to combat.
Figure A.4, which was taken from a 2010 Congressional Research Service report, shows that
from 1980 through 2000 less than 1000 servicemen died during a military deployment. For some
individuals such as blacks, joining the military during this time actually decreased the probability
of dying young. Additionally, individuals in the military during the late 1970s and early 1980s
likely thought that the Vietnam War’s outcome and the global politics of the time made a large
American military deployment unlikely.
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wage wra and a non-pecuniary cost for participating in both sectors:
Rcr(Sa) = R
c
a + βcr + w
r
a
Rhr(Sa) = R
h
a + βhr + w
r
a
If a man chooses to increase his civilian sector human capital by attending school,
he must pay a cost. Let 1 be an indicator variable whose value is one when the
argument in the subscript is true and zero otherwise. The cost of attending school
is given by:
Rs(Sa) = β0,s − β1,s112≤ga<16 − β2,s116≤ga − β3,s(1− dsa−1) + εsa
where β0,s is a preference endowment, β1,s is the cost of attending college, β2,s is the
cost of attending graduate school, β3,s is the psychic cost of entering or re-entering
college given that the man did not attend school last period, and εsa is a preference
shock. It is assumed that college takes four years to complete and that graduate
school can be attended indefinitely.
If a man does not work in the civilian sector, attend school, or serve active duty,
then he stays home. The value of staying home is:
Rh(Sa) = β0,h + ε
h
a
where β0,h is a preference endowment and ε
h
a is a preference shock.
The shocks εa = {εca, εsa, εha, εata , εra} are jointly normally distributed with mean
21
zero and variance/covariance matrix Σ. It is assumed that the shocks are indepen-
dently and identically distributed.
3.1.3 Military
The previous chapter briefly outlines how the military screens, promotes, and com-
pensates its personnel. This section presents how the military’s features are incor-
porated into the model.
Eligibility
The military imposes a maximum enlistment age and a mandatory retirement age.
Since these restrictions vary over time and by service branch, a “rule of thumb”
is established in the model. The model requires that a man must retire from the
military after 30 years of service and cannot enlist after age 24.5
The AFQT scores reported in the data are from an ASVAB that was admin-
istered to all survey participants in 1979. These AFQT scores were collected as
survey data only and were not used for enlistment qualification. Consequently,
survey participants had no incentive to perform well. Furthermore, some survey
participants were as young as age 14 at the time of the test. Consequently, some
military participants in the data have reported AFQT scores that place them below
5In reality the maximum enlistment age ranges in the mid to late 30s. In the data, however,
no one joins the military after age 24. Consequently, 24 was chosen as the maximum enlistment
age.
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the military’s enlistment qualification standards.6 To account for military policies
as well as the data, in the model high school graduates who have not already en-
listed and have an AFQT score in the lowest quartile qualify for military enlistment
with probability pim, while men who have not already enlisted, have no high school
diploma, and have an AFQT score below the median qualify for military enlistment
with probability pid. If a man does not qualify for enlistment, all military options are
removed for his choice set. Qualification for enlistment is reevaluated each decision
period.
Promotion
Recall that promotion for non-commissioned officers is a function of current pay
grade, position availability, performance, military experience, and experience in
current pay grade. Performance and position availability, however, are not observed
in the data. Consequently, in the model promotion probabilities for all pay grades
are a function of current pay grade and military experience only. The model also
reflects actual promotion criteria in that servicemen must have a minimum amount
of military experience - which varies by pay grade - to be considered for promotion.
Since it is extremely rare, the model prohibits pay grade demotion and multiple
annual pay grade promotions.
6Recall from the previous chapter that by law the military cannot enlist individuals with an
AFQT score in the lowest decile and only 25% of enlistees may have an AFQT score in the second
and third deciles. Additionally, high school dropouts must have an AFQT score that exceeds a
cutoff value, which is usually around the median.
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When an individual joins the military, he receives a pay grade of E1 and attends
basic training. The military usually promotes individuals after they complete basic
training. Some individuals with certain pre-enlistment activities or achievements
are promoted from E1 to E3 or E4 instead of from E1 to E2. This occurs roughly
among 10% of servicemen in the data. Unfortunately, the data do not contain
information regarding which men have these activities or achievements. In the
model servicemen are promoted from E1 to E3 or E4 with a probability that is
taken from the data.
Base Pay
The amount of base pay a serviceman receives is a function of his pay grade and
military experience. Base pay takes the following form in the model:
base(pga, χ
m
a ) = β0,b + β1,bpga + β2,bχ
m
a
Retirement
Recall that individuals with at least 20 years of military service are eligible for a
pension. In the model active duty retirees start receiving pension payments the
year they retire. Reserve duty retirees start receiving pension payments at age 60.7
Pension payments are calculated using the military’s pension payment formula:
pension(pga, χ
m
a ) = base(pga, χ
m
a ) ·
(
points
365
)
· 0.025
7Military reservists can lower the age at which pension payments begin to as low as age 55 by
serving certain types of duty. Unfortunately, these types of duty cannot be observed in the data.
In the model it is assumed that the retirement age for reservists cannot be lowered from age 60.
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where points is the retirement point total. The formula calculates military experi-
ence in years and then awards 2.5% of the veteran’s highest base pay for each year
served. At most a veteran can receive 75% of base pay.
3.1.4 Business Cycle State Transitions
During each decision period men make choices given the current business cycle state.
It is necessary, therefore, to model how the business cycle evolves over time. Annual
aggregate unemployment is used to approximate the current business cycle state.
It is assumed that aggregate unemployment follows an AR1 process. Transition
probabilities between discrete aggregate unemployment states are constructed as
in Tauchen (1986) by discretizing the AR1 process into a Markov chain. It is
assumed that everyone knows the transition probabilities. It was determined that
two business cycle states are sufficient to capture the variation in the civilian sector
search cost.
3.1.5 Initial Conditions and State Space
At age 18 a man is characterized by his race (race), AFQT quartile score (afqt),
education attainment (g18), initial pay grade (pg18), and endowment of skills and
preferences across sectors (β0 = {β0,c, β0,s, β0,h, β0,at}). It is assumed that at age
18 the man possesses no civilian or military experience and attended school last
decision period. As the man makes choices each decision period, his state space
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evolves. If a man chooses to work in the civilian sector, he gains a year of civilian
experience (χca+1 = χ
c
a+1 +d
c
a+d
cr
a ). In order to award the correct pension payment
and pension starting date, it is necessary to differentiate between active duty and
reserve duty military experience. Consequently, if a man chooses to serve active
duty, he gains a year of active duty experience (χata+1 = χ
at
a+1 + d
at
a ) and if he
chooses to serve reserve duty, he gains a year of reserve duty experience (χra+1 =
χra+1 + d
rc
a + d
rh
a ). Military experience is given as the sum of active duty and
reserve duty experience (χma = χ
at
a + χ
r
a). Education attainment evolves if the man
chooses to attend school (ga+1 = ga+d
s
a). Pay grade and business cycle state evolve
probabilistically as previously mentioned. Race, AFQT quartile score, and skill and
preference endowments do not evolve. Preference and skill shocks are also in the
state space, which is given at age a by:
Sa = {a, β0, χca, χata , χra, ga, pga, race, afqt, dka−1, εa}
Unobserved Heterogeneity
To further enrich individual heterogeneity, a finite number of types are introduced.
Skill and preference endowments are allowed to vary across types. The probability
of being a certain type is conditioned on education level at age 18, race, and AFQT
quartile score.8 Only individuals know their type.
8It is true that grade level at age 18 is an endogenous decision (i.e., parents decide when their
children enter school and consequently what their grade level will be at age 18). Unfortunately,
modeling grade level at age 18 as endogenous would be computationally difficult and would re-
quire unavailable parental decision information. Consequently, it is assumed that conditional on
endowments, grade level at age 18 is exogenous.
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3.1.6 Race and Rental Prices
For black men in the model, the civilian wage offer includes an additional term βb,c.
For black men the civilian wage offer takes the following form:
wca = r
c exp{β0,c + βb,c + β1,cga + β2,cχca + β3,cχma + β4,χca2 + β5,cχcaχma + εca}
The additional term has two possible associations. If associated with the human
capital rental rate rc, βb,c reflects the value the civilian sector places on black civilian
sector skills relative to white civilian sector skills. If negative in sign and associated
with the human capital rental rate, βb,c is a measurement of racial discrimination
in civilian sector wage offers. However, if associated with the skill endowment β0,c,
then βb,c reflects racial differences in the civilian sector skill endowment. To what
extent βb,c is associated with each term is ambiguous.
9 Since it is assumed that the
military cannot racially discriminate, a similar racial term is not included in black
military wage offers.
3.1.7 Updating Choice Set and State Space
Before making his choice each decision period, the man updates his eligible choice
set and completes updating his state space. After these updates each man makes
his choice.
9Keane & Wolpin (2000)
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Choice Set
Each man’s eligible choice set evolves over time. Consequently, each man must
update his choice set at the begining of each decision period by determining whether
he is eligible for military service or school attendance. As mentioned previously,
men possessing no high school diploma and/or a low AFQT score are barred from
entering military service with some probability. If a man has left military service,
is over age 24 and is not in the military, or has served 30 years in the military, the
military is removed from his choice set. Additionally, individuals over age 30 are
prohibited from attending school. These sector restrictions can limit the choice set
to as few as two options. 10
State Space
When a man enters a new decision period, he updates his state space. From last
decision period’s choice the man knows how his civilian experience, military ex-
perience, and education attainment evolve. Additionally, the man learns at the
beginning of each decision period the current business cycle state, whether he was
promoted last period (if he served in the military), and the values of that decision
period’s skill and preference shocks.
10In reality retired veterans sometimes re-enter the military and some men over age 30 attend
school. However, in the data both events occur very rarely. Consequently, for the sake of data fit,
the schooling and military re-entry restrictions are imposed on the choice set.
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3.1.8 The Man’s Problem
Men maximize their present discounted expected utility over a finite horizon. Let-
ting δ be the discount factor and Ka the choice set at age a, the value function at
age a is:
V (Sa) = max
dka
E
[
A∑
i=a
δA−a
Ka∑
k=1
Rkad
k
a|Sa
]
The value function can also be written as the maximum over choice-specific value
functions as in Bellman (1957).
Final Decision Period Problem
Since every man retires after age A, the man’s problem at age A is different from
all previous decision periods. More specifically, when making his choice in the final
decision period, each man considers only the utility he receives that period. There
is no need to consider how the decision period’s choice will affect future decision
period utilities since there are no future decision periods. Consequently, at age A
the man’s choice simply maximizes over the reward functions:
V (SA) = max
k∈KA
[Rk(SA)]
Not Final Decision Period Problem
If a man is younger than age A, however, his problem is very different from the final
decision period problem. In addition to the utility he receives in the current decision
period, the man’s choice must now also consider how it impacts expected utility
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in future decision periods. This consideration exists because the current decision
period’s choice will affect future human capital. Furthermore, the current decision
period’s choice can alter future choice sets and military pension eligibility.
If a < A, the current decision period’s choice maximizes the utility received
this decision period plus the discounted expectation of the next decision period’s
value function given the current decision period’s choice. The decision period’s
value function is an expectation because future shocks and choices have not been
realized. The man also weights the future by business cycle transition probabilities
and promotion probabilities. For a < A, the man’s value function can be written
as:
V (Sa) = max
k∈K
[V k(Sa)]
where V k(Sa)) is:
V k (Sa) = R
k
a + δ
∑
j
pija+1|jaE
[
V (Sa+1) |Sa, dka = 1
]
where pija+1|ja is a business cycle transition probability. If a man is serving in the
military, there is a possibility that he will be promoted at the end of the period.
When promotion is possible, V k(Sa)) is:
V k (Sa) = R
k
a + δ
∑
j
pija+1|ja [pipga+1E[V (Sa+1) |Sa, dka = 1]
+ (1− pipga+1)E[V (Sa+1) |Sa, dka = 1]]
where pipga+1 is a promotion probability. However, if a man is not serving in the
military and there is a probability that he may not qualify for military service in
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the next period, the discounted expectation of the next period’s value function is
weighted by the probability that the military may not be in the man’s choice set in
the next decision period. Depending on the reason for disqualification, V k(Sa)) is
either:
V k (Sa) = R
k
a + δ
∑
j
pija+1|ja [pidE[V (Sa+1) |Sa, dka = 1]
+ (1− pid)E[V (Sa+1) |Sa, dka = 1]]
or:
V k (Sa) = R
k
a + δ
∑
j
pija+1|ja [pimE[V (Sa+1) |Sa, dka = 1]
+ (1− pim)E[V (Sa+1) |Sa, dka = 1]]
3.2 Solution Method
Starting at the terminal period the model is solved using backward recursion. This
section outlines the recursion process and describes how certain expectations critical
to the solution method are approximated.
First, consider the man’s problem at age A. As stated in the previous section,
at age A each man’s choice maximizes over the set of eligible reward functions given
his state space position SA. Consequently, knowing the reward functions and SA is
sufficient to solve for a man’s choice at age A.
At age A−1, however, the man’s choice maximizes over the reward function plus
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the discounted expectation of age A’s value function given SA−1 and his choice at
age A−1. Therefore, in order to solve the man’s problem at age A−1 the expected
value function at age A must be calculated for every eligible choice k ∈ K. This
expectation is a multivariate integral and takes the form:
E
[
max
[
R1 (SA) , . . . , R
K (SA) |S¯A−1, dkA−1 = 1
]]
=∫
. . .
∫
max
[
R1 (SA) , . . . , R
K (SA) |S¯A−1, dkA−1
]
(3.2.1)
· f (εc, εs, εh, εr, εat) dεcdεsdεhdεrdεat
Taken over the shock distribution, (3.2.1) calculates the expected maximum reward
function value at age A given S¯A−1 and the choice k.11 Since the reward functions
and shock distribution are known, (3.2.1) can be calculated. Notice that for every
realization of S¯A−1 and k, (3.2.1) takes a different value. Therefore (3.2.1) must be
calculated for every realization of S¯A−1 and k.
The solution problem at age A−2 is similar to the problem at age A−1 in that
the man maximizes over the reward function plus the discounted expectation of age
A− 1’s value function given SA−2 and his choice at age A− 2. However, at A− 2
the expectation of A− 1’s value function contains more than the reward functions
at age A− 1:
E
[
max
[
V 1 (SA−1) , . . . , V K (SA−1) |S¯A−2, dkA−2 = 1
]]
(3.2.2)
Fortunately, since the previous period’s problem is solved, V
[
SA−1|S¯A−2, dkA−2 = 1
]
can be calculated for any S¯A−2, k, and εA−1. Consequently, (3.2.2) can be calculated.
11S¯a is Sa excluding εa.
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The recursive process outlined above is used to solve the man’s problem from
age A − 1 to the first decision period at age 18. For each age a, the following
expectation must be solved for every Sa and k:
E
[
max
[
R1 (Sa+1) , . . . , R
K (Sa+1) |S¯a, dka = 1
]]
(3.2.3)
Unfortunately, (3.2.3) is a multivariate integral that does not have a simple
analytical solution. Consequently, for every feasible point in the state space, Monte
Carlo integration is used to compute (3.2.3). First, Y draws of ε are taken from the
shock distribution. Second, (3.2.3) is evaluated at each choice k for each shock draw
y ∈ Y . Third, for each y ∈ Y , the maximum evaluation across k is determined.
Lastly, the maximum evaluations are summed across y and then divided by Y -
providing an average maximum evaluation. The average maximum evaluation is
used to approximate (3.2.3).
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Chapter 4
Data
The data are from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY79), military pay tables, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The NLSY79
tracks 12,686 individuals who ranged in age from 14 to 22 when they were first
interviewed in 1979. The NLSY79 interviews were conducted annually from 1979
though 1993. From 1994 to the present, interviews have been conducted biennially.
During a NLSY79 interview, information from the previous interview date to the
present is gathered. Fortunately, enough data were gathered in 1979 that some
variable histories can be constructed as far back as 1975.
A rich data source, the NLSY79 contains detailed information on demograph-
ics, civilian labor force participation, and education attainment. During the initial
interview each individual’s age, sex, and race were recorded. For each week, indi-
viduals in the NLSY79 report hours worked at all civilian jobs. Individuals are also
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asked to report civilian “wages, salary, commissions, or tips from all jobs, before
deductions for taxes or anything else” for each calendar year. For education attain-
ment, the survey annually records the highest grade completed as of May 1.
In addition to civilian data, the NLSY79 gathers military information. Multiple
survey questions are devoted to military enlistment and separation. During each
interview, individuals are asked if they have joined the military since their last in-
terview. If an individual indicates that he did join the military, he is then asked
what month and year he joined. The individual is also asked what service branch he
joined. While in the military, individuals are asked various questions regarding their
compensation, benefits, position, training, etc. For each calendar year, individuals
are asked to report all military wages before any deductions. When reporting mil-
itary wages, individuals are reminded to include all “money received from special
pays, allowances, and bonuses.” Each serviceman is also asked to report his current
pay grade. If an individual indicates that he left the military, the month and year
he left are recorded.
The NLSY79 administered the ASVAB to both civilian and military survey par-
ticipants. As mentioned previously, the ASVAB administered by the NLSY79 was
not used for military qualification and no performance reward was offered. Survey
respondents had no incentive, therefore, to perform well and consequently may not
have exerted their best effort. Additionally, the NLSY79 administered the ASVAB
to some respondents who had not yet become of military enlistment age. AFQT
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scores reported in the NLSY79 are calculated from the NLSY79 ASVAB results.
Of the 12,686 individuals tracked in the NLSY79, 6,111 individuals (3,003 male)
form the nationally representative cross-sectional sample. In addition to the cross-
sectional sample, the NLSY79 contains several over-samples. 5,295 individuals be-
long to over-samples of blacks, Hispanics, and economically disadvantaged whites.
1,280 individuals (824 male) belong to a military over-sample. All individuals in the
military over-sample served active duty in 1979. Due to budget cuts, the military
over-sample was reduced to 201 individuals in 1985.
Data were taken from two sources in addition to the NLSY79. Annual aggregate
unemployment data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In addition
to the military wage data reported in the NLSY79, military base pay data were
acquired. The military makes annual base pay tables publicly available. The tables
report base pay as a function of pay grade and military experience. Base pay tables
from 1975 through 2004 were obtained.
The analysis sample contains 3,711 males: 2,896 males from the cross-sectional
sample and 815 males from the military over-sample. Everyone in the analysis sam-
ple was tracked each academic year from age 18 until 2005 or until a gap appeared
in their data. There are 66,456 observations.
Using NLSY79 data, the following variables were constructed for each observa-
tion: age, education attainment, civilian experience, active duty experience, reserve
duty experience, military pay grade, previous decision period choice, civilian wage,
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military wage, and sample weight.1 Race and AFQT quartile score were also taken
from NLSY79 data. Annual aggregate unemployment for each observation is entered
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics data. Then using the cutoff value determined by
the discretization of the annual aggregate unemployment data, each observation’s
annual aggregate unemployment value is mapped into a business cycle state value.
Estimated base pay for each observation is calculated from a base pay regression
that uses military base pay table information.
Due to data gaps, by 1984 the analysis sample’s military over-sample compo-
nent drops from 815 to 642. The NLSY79 military over-sample reduction in 1985
removes 504 individuals from the analysis sample, 149 of whom were still in the
military in 1984.
Unlike the cross-sectional sample weights, the military over-sample weights were
not constructed to scale up to the national population. Rather, the military over-
sample weights scale up to the national active duty military population. The op-
posing weighting structures create a combined sample that does not scale up to the
national population. To correct this, military over-sample weights were modified
along with the weights of men in the cross-sectional sample who served active duty
military in 1979.2
1Variable construction details are provided in the appendix.
2Let γ79 be the sum of weights for cross-sectional sample men who served active duty military
in 1979 and γm be the sum of weights for the military over-sample. The weights for these men
were modified by multiplying them by γ79γ79+γm .
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4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Tables A.1 through A.6 display various descriptive statistics. Table A.1 reports gen-
eral descriptive statistics for the analysis sample. Table A.2 reports the nationally
representative sample’s choice distribution, while Table A.3 reports the nationally
representative sample’s choice transition probabilities. Tables A.4 and A.5 contain
high school completion by race and enlistment status and Table A.6 contains civil-
ian and military wages by age. Figure A.5 displays annual aggregate unemployment
from 1960 through 2004.
Table A.1 reports general descriptive statistics for the analysis sample both col-
lectively and by race. On average a man is observed for just under 23 years. The
average age for each observation is just under 29 years old. Both statistics vary
little by race, which suggests that sample attrition is not greatly influenced by race.
Since relatively few men join the military, average active and reserve duty expe-
rience for the entire analysis sample are both relatively low (0.6 and 0.12 years,
respectively). However, when confined to just men in the military, average active
and reserve duty experience jumps to 3.3 and 5.3 years, respectively. The typical
observation has just less than 7 years of civilian experience.
Approximately 28% of the analysis sample joins the military at some point. This
statistic may be somewhat deceiving, however, since it includes both the nationally
representative sample and the military over-sample. Excluding the military over-
sample, 9.6% of the analysis sample joins the military at some point. For those in
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the military, the average pay grade is E3 or E4.
Table A.1 reveals several racial differences in the data. Blacks join the military
at a much higher rate than whites.3 In the analysis sample, 39.2% of blacks and
26.2% of whites join the military. Again this statistic is deceiving, however, since
it includes both the nationally representative sample and the military over-sample.
Excluding the military over-sample, 12.3% of blacks and 9.34% of whites join the
military at some point. On average, blacks have 1.5 fewer years of civilian experi-
ence and an AFQT score 30 points lower than whites. When in the military, blacks
stay over a year longer on average and have a higher average pay grade than whites.
When attempting to construct a model that describes the incentives and dis-
incentives individuals associate with various choices, it is important to understand
individuals’ choice distribution. Table A.2 reports the choice distribution by age for
the nationally representative component of the analysis sample. There are several
trends in the choice data. At age 18 about a quarter of men choose to work in
the civilian sector. As men age, however, their representation in the civilian labor
force increases. By age 21 the proportion of men in the civilian workforce doubles
to about 50%. Around age 24 the rate of increase in the proportion of men in the
civilian workforce drops to under 5%. By age 30 about 84% of men work in the
civilian sector.
The school attendance and home sector participation trends are opposite the
civilian sector participation trend. At ages 18 and 19 many individuals are either
3Hispanics are reported with whites.
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completing high school or starting college. Consequently, the school attendance rate
is at its highest at ages 18 and 19. Over time, students either drop out or receive
their degree or diploma. By age 24 just over 6% attend school, while at age 30 less
than 1.5% attend school. From age 18 to 20 a surprisingly large number of men
stay home despite the other available choices. At age 18 about 32% of men stay
home, while at age 20 about 23% of men stay home. The stay home rate continues
to decrease during the early to mid 20s. At age 22 and beyond, more men stay
home than attend school. After age 25 the stay home rate stabilizes around 14%.
Unlike the other choice trends, both the active and reserve duty choice trends
rise, peak, and then decline. Most men who join the military do so between age 18
and 20 and stay four to five years. This results in peak active duty participation
around age 20 and 21. The active duty participation rate starts at about 2.2% at
age 18. By age 20, active duty participation has climbed over 210%, to 4.7%. After
age 24 active duty participation decreases dramatically and by age 30 active duty
participation is under 1%. Although much lower than active duty participation,
reserve duty participation exhibits the same general trend. Reserve duty participa-
tion starts at 1% at age 18 and peaks a few years later at 1.6% at age 22. By age
26, reserve duty participation is under 1%. Notice that when compared to other
choices, the military participation rates are relatively low.
It is important to understand how individuals transition between choices. Ta-
ble A.3 reports sector transition rates for the nationally representative sample. All
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choices persist significantly, with working in the civilian sector and serving active
duty having the greatest persistence at 91% and 85%, respectively. Once an in-
dividual starts working in the civilian sector, he is very unlikely to transition into
anything else. Transitions from the civilian sector to school or to the military are
under 1% each. At 7.5%, staying home is the second highest transition rate for men
in the civilian sector. Student transition rates are most broadly distributed across
choices. 27% of students transition to the civilian sector, while 18% transition to
home. School attendance persists at a rate of 53%. About 2% of students transition
into the military. Most men who stay home continue to do so. About 40% of home
participants transition to the civilian sector. Men serving on active or reserve duty
tend to stay in the military. For those leaving active duty, about 64% transition to
home, while about 30% transition to the civilian sector. When leaving the reserves,
most men enter the civilian sector.
As mentioned previously, the military limits how many high school dropouts it
can recruit. During the mid to late 1970s, the military was learning what informa-
tion signaled that a volunteer would likely perform poorly in the military. Figure
A.6 shows that high school dropouts - including dropouts who possess a General
Education Diploma, or GED - are more likely to leave the military within 24 months
of enlistment. Consequently, in the early 1980s the military decided to further re-
strict how many high school dropouts it recruited. This reform occurred while the
NLSY79 sample was of military enlistment age.4
4Committee on the Youth Population and Military Recruitment (2003)
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Given military recruitment policy, which restricts high school dropout enlistment
and which changed during sample collection, and racial differences in education at-
tainment, it is important to understand who graduates from high school. Table
A.4 displays high school diploma status for the nationally representative sample by
race, while Table A.5 displays high school diploma status for the nationally repre-
sentative sample at time of enlistment. Table A.4 shows that blacks graduate high
school at a lower rate than whites. At age 19 the high school diploma gap is at its
worst at about 17%. At age 20 and above, however, the high school diploma gap
shrinks to about 12%. When introducing unobserved skill and preference hetero-
geneity into the model, Table A.4 supports conditioning type probabilities by high
school diploma status and race. Including both variables in the type probability de-
termination allows the estimation process to disentangle the effects these variables
have on unobserved skill and preference endowments.
Turning attention to high school diploma status at time of enlistment as reported
in Table A.5, it is difficult not to notice that a large difference exists between the
diploma status of those who enlist at age 18 and those who enlist later. Just under
60% of men who enlist at age 18 possess a high school diploma, while about 88%
of men who enlist at age 19 or older possess a high school diploma. There are
several possible explanations for this difference. It could be that shifts in military
recruitment policy during the sample collection period are responsible. Rather, it
could be that high school dropouts at age 18 see little utility in other sectors and
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therefore join the military in particularly large numbers. The difference could also
be explained by the fact that the sample’s proportion of high school graduates rises
over time, and consequently, older first-time enlistees are more likely to possess a
diploma. Whatever the explanation, Table A.5 shows that relative to high school
graduates, high school dropouts are very attracted to military service.
Table A.6 reports mean military and civilian wages by age. Wages increase as
men accumulate education, civilian experience and military experience over time,
although the rate of increase varies. From age 18 through 27, wages for civilian
sector workers rise 236%, while wages for men serving active duty and reserve duty
rise 230% and 251%, respectively. Regardless of which age is considered, the civilian
wage is greater than the active duty wage, which is greater than the reserve duty
wage.
As men age, the gap between civilian and military wages increases. At age 18,
the mean active duty wage is 88% of the mean civilian wage. By age 20 - when
military participation is at its highest - the percentage has deteriorated to 85%. For
men age 24, the gap between civilian and military wages is 83%. Finally, by age 35
the percentage has deteriorated to just under 78%.
Figure A.5 reports the United States’ annual aggregate unemployment rate from
1950 through 2007.5 The graph reveals that the aggregate unemployment rate dur-
ing the early 1980s was very high. Furthermore, except for 1978 and 1979, the
annual aggregate unemployment rate from 1975 through the mid 1980s was rela-
5Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010)
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tively high. During the mid 1990s, however, the annual aggregate unemployment
rate is relatively low.
The relatively high annual aggregate unemployment rates of the late 1970s and
early 1980s have implications for the model’s discretization of the business cycle.
Recall that annual aggregate unemployment is used to approximate the business
cycle. In the model most men make the military participation decision between
age 18 and 21. Furthermore, in the data most men are between age 18 and 21
during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Business cycle variation during the late
1970s and early 1980s, therefore, most directly affects military participation in the
data. When discretizing the business cycle, not enough variation exists during the
late 1970s and early 1980s to have more than two business cycle states. If more
states are added, the best business cycle states are not realized in the data until
the mid 1990s. By the mid 1990s, however, every man in the data has made his
military participation and education attainment decisions. Consequently, model-
ing two business cycle states is sufficient because it adequately captures business
cycle variation when men in the data are making their military participation and
education attainment decisions.
4.2 Capturing Data Trends
Tables A.2 and A.3 reveal that the data contain significant age and transition trends.
It is important to allow the model to distinguish these trends from unobserved het-
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erogeneity. Otherwise, the degree of unobserved heterogeneity may be overstated.
To capture these trends, age trend parameters were added to the schooling and
stay-home reward functions Rsa and R
h
a , an age 18 non-pecuniary utility parameter
was added to the reward for serving reserve duty and staying home, and persistence
parameters were added to almost all reward functions.6
6The appendix contains a complete description of functional forms, including all trend capturing
parameters.
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Chapter 5
Estimation
5.1 Estimation Method
There are several considerations when estimating the model. In addition to men’s
choices, men’s wages are observed as an outcome in the data. Furthermore, observed
wages are measured with error. Type heterogeneity must be incorporated into the
estimation method. This section presents the estimation method, explains how the
considerations above are addressed in the estimation method, and presents how
standard errors are calculated.
Likelihood function maximization is used to estimate the model. Due to the
shocks’ serial independence, the likelihood function can be written as the product
of within-period outcome probabilities across men:
L(θ|X) =
N∏
i=1
(
T∑
t=1
pit
Ai∏
a=18
P
[
Oa|S¯a,i, t
])wti
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where Oa = {dka, wk,oa } is the outcome at age a, wk,oa is the observed wage, X is the
data, θ is the parameter vector, N is the sample size, Ai is the oldest age at which
individual i is observed, wti is an individual’s sample weight, pit is the probability of
being type t, and T is the number of types. If a wage is not observed, the outcome
at age a is just the man’s choice dka.
It is assumed that there exists within the data a finite number of heterogeneous
types. Skill and preference endowments vary across types. It is not known what
type each man belongs to because types are not observed. Instead, the probability
of being a certain type conditional on possessing certain observable characteristics
is estimated.
Type probabilities pit are parameterized using a multinomial logit model. Let
Z be a 1 × 5 vector containing a high school diploma status at age 18 indicator,
a race indicator, and AFQT quartile score indicators and let γt be a 5 × 1 vector
containing five parameters. For all types greater than one, the multinomial logit
takes the form:
pit = P (type = t 6= 1) = exp {γ0,t + γtZ}
1 +
T∑
t=2
exp {γ0,t + γtZ}
for type one, the multinomial logit takes the form:
pit = P (type = 1) =
1
1 +
T∑
t=2
exp {γ0,t + γtZ}
When a man works in the civilian sector or serves in the military, a wage is
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usually observed. After examining the civilian and military wage data, however, it
becomes clear that wages are measured with error.1 For choice k it is assumed that
the measurement error takes the following multiplicative form:
wk,oa = w
k
a · exp{ηka} (5.1.1)
where wka is the model’s wage offer, w
k,o
a is the observed wage, and η
k
a is a shock
distributed N(0, σ2ηk). E[εkηk] = 0.
Suppose the outcome at age a is comprised of choice k and an observed wage.
The probability of observing that outcome is given by:
P
(
dka = 1, w
k,o
a |S¯a
)
=
∫
wka
P
(
dka = 1|wka, S¯a
) · P (wk,oa , wka|S¯a) (5.1.2)
The outcome probability is an integral over the model’s wage offer as the wage offer
is not observed in the data. The integral is calculated using Monte Carlo integra-
tion. Y draws are taken of ε.2 The kernel’s first term is the probability of choosing
k given S¯a and is calculated using a smoothing simulator.
3 The kernel’s second term
is the joint probability of observing both the wage offer and the observed wage. For
each draw y ∈ Y , the kernel is calculated as the product of its two terms. The
1For example, some active duty military participants with multiple years of military experi-
ence report an annual wage below $1,500. Given military pay tables, such wages are unrealistic.
Additionally, several individuals with 15 plus years of civilian experience report an annual civilian
wage under $1,000.
2The relationship described in (5.1.1) implies that given wk,oa and ε
k
a, η
k
a can be solved for.
3Let τ be the smoothing parameter, which is set to 500. As in Eckstein & Wolpin (1999), for
each draw of ε, the kernel’s first term is:
exp
[
V kdka=1
(Sa)−max[V k(Sa)]
τ
]/∑
k
exp
[
V k(Sa)−max[V k(Sa)]
τ
]
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integral is calculated as the kernel’s average over Y draws. If an outcome does not
include an observed wage, then (5.1.2) reduces to P
(
dka = 1|S¯a
)
and is calculated
using just the smoothing simulator as described above.
Identification of the wage parameters and wage error variances comes from the
wage and choice data. The measurement error variances are identified by the wage
data and assumptions on the measurement errors’ distributional forms. The school-
ing and home parameters as well as the non-pecuniary civilian employment and
military parameters are identified by the choice data.
All military wage offers in the model are a function of military base pay. Thus,
the model requires knowing the base pay of every current and potential serviceman.
Military base pay, however, is not reported separately from total military pay in
the data. Using military pay table data, base pay for every man is estimated by
ordinary least squares or OLS regression with pay grade and military experience as
the exogenous variables. With an R2 value of 0.93, the OLS regression fits the base
pay data well.
Standard errors for the parameter estimates are calculated using the BHHH es-
timator. The BHHH estimator does not require taking a second derivative, which
would be difficult to calculate given the likelihood function’s form.4 Let P be the
number of parameters. The BHHH estimator takes the following form:
[I (θ)]−1 =
[
N∑
i=1
gig
′
i
]−1
(5.1.3)
4Greene (2008)
49
where for individual i, gi is the following P × 1 vector:
gi =
∂ lnL (xi, θ)
∂θ
The standard errors are the diagonal terms in (5.1.3).5
5.2 Simulation
After the model is estimated it is used to simulate choice behavior under current
policies as well as under counterfactual policies. This section describes how simu-
lations are conducted.
The first step in conducting a simulation is creating the simulation participants’
initial state space positions. Ideally, the choices of simulation participants reflect
the choices that men in the data would make. Consequently, when it comes to the
attributes that drive decision making (i.e., the initial state space positions), the
simulation participants’ distribution should be the same as the data’s distribution.
To achieve this result, the initial state space of every man in the data is used to cre-
ate the initial state space of 40 simulation participants. In total 148,440 simulation
participants are created and - for the initial state space’s observable components -
the data and simulated participant distributions are equal.
Creating simulation participants from the data does not ensure that the initial
state space distributions are identical because not all of the state space is observed
in the data. Endowment type is not observed in the data and initial pay grade is
5Standard errors are reported with the parameter estimates in the appendix.
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not always observed in the data.6 Consequently, before simulating behavior, each
simulation participant needs an endowment type and an initial pay grade. Using
the estimated endowment type probabilities, which are conditioned on observable
components of the initial state space, each simulation participant is given an endow-
ment type. Initial pay grades are assigned using the initial pay grade distribution
observed in the data.
After initial state space positions are constructed for the simulation participants
and the model is solved,7 choices are simulated. Starting at age 18, each decision
period, each simulation participant receives a draw from the shock distribution and
then chooses from his available choice set. After making his choice, each simula-
tion participant receives his reward and learns how his state space and choice set
evolve.8 As simulation participants move through the model, their decisions and
state space positions are recorded. When simulation results are reported, only re-
sults for simulation participants generated from the nationally representative sample
are included.9
6For men who join the military at age 18, initial pay grade is observed. However, for all other
men it is not known what pay grade they would enter the military with because they have not
been observed in the military.
7See Chapter Three to learn how the model is solved.
8That is, what experience and grade level he obtains, what next period’s business cycle state
will be, whether he is promoted (provided that he is in the military), and whether he qualifies for
military service.
9Only results for simulation participants generated from the nationally representative sample
are reported because the study is interested in how the simulated counterfactual experiments
impact the national population.
51
5.3 Model Fit
This section describes model fit and compares the simulation results to the nation-
ally representative sample. Overall, the model fits the data reasonably well.
Table A.7 contains the simulation’s choice distribution. The simulation success-
fully matches each choice’s temporal trend. Predicted civilian sector participation
increases steadily over time and eventually reaches around 84%. School attendance
peaks at age 18 and then decreases steadily to just under 6% at age 24. By age 30,
2.5% of men are predicted to be in school compared to 2% in the data. Predicted
home participation decreases over time. The simulation slightly over-predicts or
under-predicts home participation between age 22 and 26.
Although military participation is a relatively low proportion of the data, the
model does a good job fitting the military choice trends and participation rates. As
in the data, simulated active duty participation is relatively high at age 19 through
22 and then quickly declines. In the simulation, however, active duty participation
does not peak as high and dissipates less quickly than in the data. Though peaking
two years after the data, the simulation’s reserve duty participation trend also fits
the data well.
Table A.8 presents yearly goodness of fit statistics for the choice distribution.
Calculated using the likelihood-ratio test, these statistics provide a way to test
whether the simulated choice distribution is consistent with the data’s choice dis-
tribution. Pearson’s chi square test was considered for calculating the goodness of
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fit statistics. Unfortunately, when the frequency of some choices is relatively low,
Pearson’s chi square test statistic no longer follows a chi square distribution. Con-
sequently, it was decided to use the likelihood-ratio test to calculate the statistic
and to condense all military choices when calculating goodness of fit. The resulting
likelihood-ratio test statistic is distributed chi square with three degrees of free-
dom.
For half of the years reported in Table A.8, the test does not reject the null
hypothesis at a 5% significance level that the simulation’s choice distribution is
consistent with the data’s choice distribution. Examining Table A.8, it is notewor-
thy that all three statistics reported after age 30 do not reject the null hypothesis.
If every test statistic after age 30 was reported, about two thirds of all test statistics
would not reject the null hypothesis.
Table A.9 contains the simulation’s sector transition percentages. As in the
data, there is a high degree of choice persistence in the simulation. The predicted
transition rate from the civilian sector to the civilian sector is 93.1% compared to
an actual rate of 91.0%. Transitions from the civilian sector to home are predicted
at 5.5% compared to an actual 7.4%. Simulated schooling transitions fit the data,
with a predicted school to school transition rate of 51% compared to an actual rate
of 52%. Transitions from the home sector to the home sector are over-predicted by
a few percentage points. The active duty to active duty transition rate is predicted
to be 89% compared to an actual transition rate of 85%. About 4.5% of active duty
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participants are predicted to transition to the civilian sector. Except for the tran-
sition from the reserves to the civilian sector, reserve transitions are well predicted.
Table A.10 reports simulated military participation rates. Military participation
rates are well predicted, with the predicted overall rate of 9.7% being slightly higher
than the actual rate of 9.6%. Among whites, the predicted military participation
rate is 9.36% compared to an actual rate of 9.24%. The predicted participation rate
among blacks is 12.22% compared to an actual rate of 12.32%.
Table A.10 also contains average military career length information for men who
join the military. Due to data attrition it is difficult to compare simulated average
career length to the actual average career length. With data attrition, average ca-
reer length is 5.4 years with whites staying 5.4 years and blacks staying 5.6 years.
The simulation predicts that average career length is 6.1 years with whites staying
5.8 years and blacks staying 7.8 years. In both the data and the simulation, blacks
on average stay in the military longer than whites.
Table A.11 reports wage fit. Both the civilian and active duty wage mean and
standard deviation are well predicted. The reserve duty mean wage, however, is
over-predicted. This result probability occurred because the reserve wage distribu-
tion is highly skewed and the number of reserve duty wage observations is low.
Table A.12 reports the simulated and actual AFQT quartile score distribution
for military participants. The AFQT quartile score distribution below the median is
well predicted. Additionally, the simulation is consistent with the military recruit-
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ment policy that no more than 25% of military participants may have an AFQT
score below the third decile. Above the median, the simulation distribution slightly
over-predicts the proportion of military participants with an AFQT score in the
fourth quartile.
Parameters
All parameter estimates and standard errors are reported in the appendix. Table
A.22 reports all civilian and military wage offer parameter estimates. The civilian
sector wage offer’s parameter estimates reveal that the civilian sector places a high
premium on civilian sector experience relative to military sector experience. Specif-
ically, for individuals with no experience in either sector, civilian wages increase
10.68% with an extra year of civilian experience and 2.76% with an extra year of
military experience. Table A.22 also reports the parameter estimate for the racial
term in the civilian setor wage offer, which is interpreted as either a racial difference
in the civilian sector human capital rental rate or racial differences in civilian sector
skill endowments. With a negative value, the parameter suggests the presence of
racial discrimination in the civilian sector and/or racial differences in civilian sector
skill endowments that are favorable to whites.
Table A.22 also reports the parameter estimates from the base pay regression.
When entering the military, a new active duty recruit can expect to earn about
$5,500 a year. Base pay increases in both pay grade and military experience. More
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specifically, being promoted adds about $1,150 to an active duty salary while ac-
quiring a year of military experience increases active duty pay by just over $300.
Again, with an R2 value of 0.93, the base pay regression fits the base pay data well.
Table A.13 contains the business cycle transition matrix as well as the estimated
civilian sector search cost for the severe business cycle state. The probability of
transitioning from the good business cycle state to the severe business cycle state is
about 35%, while the probability of the opposite transition is 40%. If the economy
is in the severe business cycle state, individuals pay a $635 search cost to find a
civilian sector job. Adjusted for inflation, the search cost in the severe business
cycle state is about $1,350 in 2009 dollars.
Types
It is assumed that the sample comprises four heterogeneous types, with each type
representing a set of sector skill and preference endowments at age 18. Table A.14
reports type probabilities by race, high school diploma status at age 18, and AFQT
quartile score. The type probability distributions help to explain racial differences
in the data. For both whites and blacks, type probabilities change as AFQT quar-
tile score increases. Specifically, as AFQT quartile score increases, the probability
of being type two decreases and the probability of being type four increases. This
AFQT trend is especially significant for blacks because blacks’ AFQT scores re-
side primarily in the first and second quartiles. Consequently, when compared to
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whites, relatively more blacks are type two - a type that possesses a very high home
preference and low skill and preference endowments across all other sectors. Since
whites’ AFQT scores are almost uniformly distributed across quartiles, whites are
relatively more likely to be type four - a type that has very high civilian sector skills
and a high schooling preference.
Both whites and blacks are very likely to be type one or type three. When com-
pared to the other two types, type one and type three individuals have high skill
and preference endowments across all sectors, including active duty service. It may
initially appear odd that between type one and type three relatively more whites
than blacks are type one. After all, type one individuals have the highest active
duty skills, but in the data, blacks choose active duty service at a relatively higher
rate than whites. The decision to join the military, however, is not determined
by active duty skill endowments alone. Rather, each man considers his skill and
preference endowments across sectors when making the military participation deci-
sion. When compared to type three, type one men have higher skill and preference
endowments across all sectors, which makes all sectors attractive. Consequently,
it is understandable that type one whites who have the highest active duty skill
endowments do not necessarily join the military at a greater rate than blacks.
Tables A.15 through A.18 report the choice distribution for each type. For the
sake of brevity, this paragraph focuses on the type choice distribution at age 20.
While a substantial percentage of all types work in the civilian sector, at just over
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56%, type one has the largest proportion working in the civilian sector. By age 20,
most men who attend school attend college. A very large proportion of type four
men attend college, while a small percentage of type two men attend college. Type
two men spend a lot of time at home relative to other types, while type four men
are least likely to stay home. Most active duty participants are type three, although
type one and type two men also serve active duty. While no type four men serve
active duty, the majority of reservists are type four.
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Chapter 6
Discussion and Experiments
This chapter discusses the estimation results and presents the counterfactual ex-
periments. The parameter estimates provide insight into the factors that motivate
military service. Unobserved heterogeneity accounted for by the finite type mix-
ture reveals that skill and preference endowments vary widely across men. While
men possess a wide range of active duty skill endowments, men with higher en-
dowments of active duty skills are more likely to join the military. When making
the military participation decision, however, men take into account their skills and
preferences across all sectors. Consequently, possessing high active duty skills does
not necessarily guarantee that a man will join the military. For example, type three
men, who by far have the greatest active duty participation rate, do not possess
the greatest active duty skills across types. Rather, type three men possess a high
active duty skill endowment and relatively low skill and preference endowments in
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other sectors. Men whose endowments give them high active duty skills relative to
their other skills are most likely to join the military.
While important, skill and preference heterogeneity is not the only factor that
influences the military participation decision. The civilian sector search cost, which
varies over the business cycle, is another influencing factor. If the business cycle
state is severe, the civilian sector search cost is high and men are dissuaded from en-
tering the civilian workforce. Since civilian sector wage offers are lowest when men
are young and have little civilian sector human capital, the civilian sector search
cost is most effective in dissuading civilian sector participation during the model’s
initial decision periods. The civilian sector search cost drives young men away from
the civilian workforce and into other sectors. If a young man receives low utility
from attending school or staying home and is dissuaded from the civilian workforce
by the high search cost associated with a severe business cycle state, then he is
likely to perceive the military as his most attractive option.
The estimated value of the racial term in the civilian wage offer aids in un-
derstanding why blacks join the military more than whites. Whether attributed
to racial discrimination and/or racial differences in civilian skill endowments, the
racial term’s negative value means that all other things equal blacks receive lower
average civilian sector wage offers than whites. This creates an incentive for blacks
to join non-civilian sectors such as the military.
The model reveals that some factors surprisingly do not influence the military
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participation decision. Some research has supported the suggestion that men receive
a large positive non-pecuniary reward from military service - a so called “patriotism
effect.”1 The model’s active duty reward function includes a parameter that cap-
tures the non-pecuniary utility associated with military service. Thus, it has been
suggested that this non-pecuniary utility term - which includes the patriotism effect
- should be positive. But after estimation the non-pecuniary utility associated with
active duty service is revealed to be essentially zero. The result does not imply,
however, that the patriotism effect is negative because the non-pecuniary utility
term is the net utility of all non-pecuniary military service incentives and disincen-
tives. Rather, the term’s value suggests that disincentives to military service such
as loss of personal freedom or time away from family are strong enough to counter
military service incentives such as the patriotism effect.
The model also provides a mechanism for some results found in the literature.
The parameter estimates reveal that the civilian sector places a substantial pre-
mium on civilian experience relative to military experience. Consequently, when a
man retires from the military and enters the civilian workforce, he brings with him
experience that is valued less than the experience he would have accumulated if he
had been part of the civilian workforce in the past. Furthermore, the man’s peers
who acquired civilian experience while the man was in the military will receive a
higher civilian sector wage than the man because they possess more valuable civilian
sector human capital. Recall that Angrist (1998) and Hirsh & Mehay (2003) control
1Kleykamp (2006)
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for selection into the military and find that on average military veterans earn less in
the civilian sector than men who have never served in the military. The parameter
estimates and the consequences the estimates imply for military veterans entering
the civilian workforce are consistent with the results in Angrist (1998) and Hirsh &
Mehay (2003).
The estimated model is used to conduct several counterfactual experiments.
Most experiment results are reported in Tables A.19 and A.20.2 The experiments
can be divided into three categories: military compensation and promotion experi-
ments, racial wage gap experiments, and business cycle experiments.
In the following sections many military participation rate, military career length,
and race related results are reported. Noticeably absent from most reported results,
however, is the military AFQT quartile score result. AFQT quartile score results
are omitted because changes to the military AFQT quartile score distribution are
highly correlated with the military’s racial distribution. Blacks have AFQT quar-
tile scores primarily in the first and second quartiles, while whites have an AFQT
quartile score distribution that is more uniformly distributed across quartiles. Con-
sequently, when blacks leave the military the average AFQT quartile score increases.
Reporting the racial result sufficiently imparts the AFQT quartile score result.
2Tables A.19 and A.20 report the military participation rate and average military career length
for all experiments as well as for the baseline simulation.
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6.1 Compensation and Promotion Experiments
The model can be used to perform experiments that alter the military compensa-
tion structure in various ways. Experiments can alter the return to pay grade, the
return to military experience, pension payments, etc. This study alters military
base pay and military pension payments in order to determine military participa-
tion elasticities. The base pay elasticity experiments, which alter military base pay
by varying degrees, reveal that the military participation rate increases about 5%
for a 1% increase in base pay.
This experimental result is in a partial equilibrium context. In reality, as mil-
itary wages increase the probability also increases that the civilian sector would
respond by increasing civilian sector wages. If civilian sector wages increase with
military wages, men would be less likely to join the military than if civilian sector
wages did not change. Consequently, if military wages rise enough, then the mili-
tary wage elasticity might be lower than the experimental result. At the margin,
however, it is unlikely that the civilian sector would increase civilian sector wages
in response to a slight increase in military wages. Thus, at the margin the experi-
mental military wage elasticity result is likely the true military wage elasticity.
Previous studies have reported various military wage elasticity values. Although
varying widely, most reported elasticities are less than the 5% elasticity reported
in this study. Upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that previous
studies and this study are reporting different elasticities. Previous studies have
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calculated the military wage elasticity of retention. That is, previous studies have
determined to what extent the rate at which servicemen leave the military changes
as military wages change. This study calculates to what extent the military partic-
ipation rate changes as military wages change. No previous study has reported the
military wage elasticity of military participation.
When considering alterations to the military compensation structure, policy-
makers are rarely concerned just with how the change will affect the military par-
ticipation rate. Fortunately, in addition to providing the military wage elasticity,
the military base pay experiments reveal how average military career length and
military AFQT distribution change as military wages change. In contrast to mili-
tary participation, average military career length does not change much in response
to increases in base pay. When base pay increases 2.5%, average military career
length increases 3.9% to 6.36 years.
One question typically asked by military manpower experts is, how can the mil-
itary draw in “smarter” recruits? The military base pay experiments suggest that
increasing military wages improves recruit quality. More specifically, increasing base
pay lowers the proportion of men in the military with an AFQT score in the lowest
quartile. Since men in the lowest AFQT quartile are considered the least desirable
military recruits, increasing base pay makes military recruits “smarter,” in some
sense.
Experiments are also performed to determine the elasticity of military participa-
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tion with respect to military pension payments. The experiments increase pension
payments by varying degrees and all find no change in the military participation
rate, average military career length, military AFQT quartile distribution, etc. The
future is too heavily discounted to make military pension payments a factor that
influences the military participation decision. Additionally, the experiments’ rev-
elation that military pension payments have little influence helps to explain why
military careers are so short. Men join the military not because it will eventually
qualify them for a pension but because it is in their immediate interest.
In addition to altering the military compensation structure, the model can be
used to perform experiments that alter the military promotion structure in various
ways. To improve the military retention rate, in 2000 Congress approved a military
pay increase targeted at experienced military personnel. But what if instead of
increasing military pay the military had increased promotion rates instead? Would
there have been significant gains in retention? To examine this possibility, two ex-
periments are performed.
In the first experiment the promotion rates for E4 and above are doubled. Pro-
motion at E4 and above is difficult - the probability is almost always under 10%.
Doubling the promotion rates, therefore, results in promotion rates that are still low
but not as low as before the experiment. The experiment increases average career
length by 18% to 7.2 years. Additionally, the military participation rate does not
change after the experiment. Thus, increasing promotion rates in 2000 would have
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achieved the same goal as the military pay increase.
In the second experiment, a more stringent promotion rate increase is intro-
duced. To determine what would happen if the military wanted to only promote
more educated personnel more quickly, the promotion rates for E4 and above are
doubled only for servicemen with at least a year of college education. The ex-
periment increases average career length by 3% to 6.3 years and, as in the first
experiment, the military participation rate does not change.
6.2 Racial Wage Gap Experiments
Various studies, such as Laurence (1992) and Moskos & Butler (1996), have argued
that blacks and other minorities are attracted to military service because unlike the
civilian sector the military provides equal employment and promotion opportuni-
ties. This lack of equal civilian sector opportunities is possibly best embodied by
the racial wage gap in the civilian sector. But what if the civilian sector racial wage
gap decreased? How would black military participation respond?
Before discussing experiments that influence the civilian sector racial wage gap,
it is important to briefly recall how racial differences enter the model. In the model,
the civilian sector racial wage gap is due to [1] racial differences in skill endowments
via the type distribution and [2] a racial term in the civilian wage offer that captures
a racial discrimination effect and/or further racial differences in skill endowments.
In addition to racial differences in the model, racial differences in the data also
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contribute to the civilian sector racial wage gap. More specifically, different racial
education attainment distributions in the data indicate different racial civilian sec-
tor human capital distributions and consequently generate different racial civilian
wage offers in the model.
As the previous paragraph outlines, the civilian sector racial wage gap is gener-
ated from multiple sources. There are, therefore, multiple experimental approaches
to reducing the wage gap. This study performs three experiments that reduce the
racial wage gap. Each experiment takes a different approach.
The first experiment removes the racial term from the civilian wage offer. Re-
moving this term removes any and all racial discrimination from the civilian wage
offer and may also remove some racial differences in civilian skill endowments. The
experiment reduces the black military participation rate by 38%. Average black
military career length drops by 7% in the experiment. Given the ambiguity associ-
ated with interpreting the civilian wage offer’s racial term, the experiment’s result
is difficult to interpret. The result does, however, place an upper bound on the
effect removing all civilian sector racial discrimination would have on military par-
ticipation.
The second experiment does not change a feature of the model. Rather, the
second experiment alters the data’s black education attainment distribution at age
18 to match the education attainment distribution of whites at age 18. The propor-
tion of blacks who are high school graduates at age 18 increases. The experiment
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reduces the black military participation rate by 32% and reduces average black mil-
itary career length by 10%. Having more education at age 18 provides blacks with
more civilian sector human capital, which reduces the racial wage gap and makes
civilian sector employment more attractive. Consequently, blacks leave the military
in large numbers and enter the civilian sector.
The effect sizes of the two experiments above are so large that they both result
in a black military participation rate that is below the military participation rate
of whites. It has to be, therefore, that removing racial differences in the civilian
sector skill endowment via the type distribution increases black military participa-
tion. Experiment three performs this action. When racial differences in the type
distribution are removed, black military participation does increase substantially.
Interpreting experiment three’s result is difficult for two reasons. First, the pres-
ence of the racial term in the civilian sector wage offer again makes interpreting the
effect on civilian sector skills difficult. Second, the type distribution affects skills
and preferences in all sectors. Consequently, more blacks could be entering the
military not because of civilian sector skill gains but because of skill and preference
changes outside the civilian sector.
Finally, another interesting question related to the civilian sector racial wage
gap is to what extent black wages would decrease if the military did not exist as an
employment option. To answer this question it would be necessary to remove all
military options available to individuals. Fortunately, the model can be altered in
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this way. Removing military options from the model decreases black wages by 0.33%
and decreases black welfare by 0.32%. Blacks would be worse off if the military did
not exist, but not substantially worse off.
6.3 Business Cycle Experiments
Although the military reports that its recruitment success is negatively correlated
with the business cycle, little research has attempted to quantify the effect that the
business cycle has on military recruitment. This section presents three experiments
that attempt to reveal to what extent the business cycle affects military recruit-
ment.
Before presenting the business cycle experiments, it is important to recall how
the business cycle enters the model and to discuss how the business cycle can be
experimentally altered. The business cycle enters the model in the form of a civilian
sector search cost. During decision periods in which the severe business cycle state
is realized, men entering or re-entering the civilian sector must pay a job search
cost. The business cycle state evolves probabilistically between decision periods.
In the model, the business cycle can be altered in two ways. The search cost that
a man pays for entering or re-entering the civilian sector can increase or decrease in
either business cycle state. Additionally, transition probabilities between business
cycle states can be altered.
Three business cycle experiments are preformed. In the first business cycle ex-
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periment, the probability of staying in the severe business cycle state is altered.
Specifically, the transition probability from the severe business cycle state to the
good business cycle state is changed from about 40% to 70%. In other words, the
experiment makes the severe business cycle state less persistent. The military par-
ticipation rate decreases by 3.2% in the experiment, while average military career
length decreases 1.8%. Overall, making the severe business cycle state less persis-
tent has relatively little effect on military participation.
In the second and third experiments, the search costs are altered. The second
experiment attempts to understand what would happen if no business cycle vari-
ation existed. To accomplish this goal, the experiment removes the state varying
search costs from the model and replaces them with a non-varying average search
cost. Removing search cost variation decreases the military participation rate 5.6%
and decreases average military career length by 0.8%. This result suggests that
military recruitment is more sensitive to economic contraction than to economic
expansion.
The third experiment attempts to ascertain the effect one severe business cycle
state has on military recruitment. Similar to an impulse response experiment in
the macroeconomic literature, the third experiment makes all men encounter the
severe business cycle state search cost at age 18. After age 18, however, all men
encounter the non-varying average search cost. When compared to the results from
the second experiment, the third experiment increases the military participation
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rate by 13.3% and increases average career length by 2.5%. For blacks the effect is
even greater with a 14.1% increase in the military participation rate.
Notice the effect size difference between the experiments that alter search costs
and the experiment that alters business cycle transition probabilities. The severe
business cycle state persistence is altered substantially in the transition probability
experiment - it is reduced by 50% - and yet the resulting effect size is relatively
small. Recall that men discount the future when making their decisions and that
business cycle transition probabilities concern only the future. Consequently, the
transition probability experiment only alters discounted future utility. The search
cost experiments, however, alter current utility as well as discounted future utility.
Furthermore, the impulse response experiment, which has by far the largest effect
size, only alters the search cost at age 18. Similar to the military compensation
experiments, the results from the business cycle state experiments suggest that the
decision to join the military is not made based on future considerations (i.e., dis-
counted future utilities) as much as it is made by immediate concerns (i.e., the
current decision period’s reward function values).
There is one noticeable limitation to the experiments above. It is reasonable
to think that, like individuals, the military alters its behavior in response to the
business cycle. For example, during the severe business cycle state the military may
impose more stringent education attainment standards for enlistment or lower its
signing bonuses. Unfortunately, the unavailability of military behavior data makes
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modeling the military’s actions very difficult. Consequently, the business cycle ex-
periments take the military’s actions as given.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
To examine the role that compensation, race, and the business cycle play in mili-
tary recruitment, this study develops and empirically implements a model of lifetime
career decision making that includes military service options. Men in the model re-
ceive civilian and military wage offers each year and then choose whether to join
the civilian workforce, attend school, stay home, serve active duty military, or serve
reserve duty military. Forward looking, each man makes choices understanding how
they affect his expected future utility. The military compensation and promotion
structure are modeled in detail. Business cycle effects are included in the model
through the introduction of a business cycle varying job search cost that men who
enter or re-enter the civilian workforce must pay. To study the effect race has on
military participation, skill and preference endowments as well as civilian wage of-
fers are allowed to vary by race. The model is estimated using simulated maximum
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likelihood and data on males from the NLSY79.
The estimation results provide new insight into why men join the military. Het-
erogeneity in skills and preference endowments across sectors influences the military
participation decision. As the business cycle state worsens, the civilian sector search
cost rises, which drives men away from the civilian workforce and into other sectors
such as the military. Relative to whites, blacks receive lower civilian sector wage
offers, which encourages blacks to accept military wage offers at a greater rate than
whites. The civilian sector places a high premium on civilian experience relative to
military experience, which could explain why military veterans on average earn less
in the civilian sector than men who do not join the military.
The counterfactual experiments contain several interesting results. Experiments
that increase military pay discover that for every 1% increase in military pay, mil-
itary participation rises about 5%. Additionally, increasing military compensation
improves the quality of military recruits. Increasing military promotion rates sig-
nificantly increases average military career length without changing the military
participation rate. Skill heterogeneity plays a substantial role in explaining racial
differences in civilian wage offers. Removing business cycle variation from the model
decreases the military participation rate by about 6%, while decreasing the persis-
tence of the severe business cycle state has a much smaller effect. Both business
cycle experiments have little effect on average military career length. Introducing
the severe business cycle state at age 18 followed by no business cycle variation
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increases the military participation rate by 13%. Military participation is not very
sensitive to changes in future compensation, such as increasing military pension
payments.
Future model extensions will require more data. Specifically, if military behavior
data could be obtained, the model could be extended to allow the military to adjust
its recruitment standards and compensation structure over the business cycle. Ad-
ditionally, if more military personnel data could be obtained and some concessions
are made regarding state space size, joining the military as a commissioned officer
could be introduced into the choice set.
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Appendix A
A.1 Exact Functional Forms
It is important to allow the model to distinguish age and persistence trends from
unobserved heterogeneity. Otherwise, the estimated model might overstate the de-
gree of unobserved heterogeneity. This section presents the model’s exact functional
forms. Wage offers, pension payments, and reward functions are fully described,
including all age and persistence parameters. Except for the schooling and home re-
ward functions, the wage offers, pension payments, and reward functions described
below are very similar to the basic forms described previously.
A.1.1 Wages
At the beginning of each decision period each man receives wage offers from the
civilian sector, the active duty military, and the reserve duty military. The civilian,
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active duty, and reserve duty wage offers take the following functional forms:
wca = r
c exp{β0,c + βb,c1blk=1 + β1,cga + β2,cχca + β3,cχma + β4,χca2 + β5,cχcaχma + εca}
wata = base(pga, χ
m
a ) · rat exp{β0,at + β1,atpga + β2,atχma + εata }
wra = base(pga, χ
m
a ) · rr exp{β0,r + β1,rpga + β2,rχma + εra}
Military wage offers are a function of military base pay. Base pay is a linear function
of pay grade and military experience:
base(pga, χ
m
a ) = β0,b + β1,bpga + β2,bχ
m
a
A.1.2 Pension Payments
A man receives military pension payments only if he has served in the military for
at least 20 years and is no longer in the military. If a man has served at least 20
years active duty, he starts receiving pension payments as soon as he leaves the
military. If a man has served at least 20 years reserve duty, he starts receiving
pension payments at age 60. Combining the military pension formula and the
pension start date rules, military pension payments take the following form:
pension = 1p
(
base(pga, χ
m
a ) ·
(
points
365
)
· 0.025
)
where p =

χata ≥ 20, data = 0
or
χra ≥ 20, dra = 0, a ≥ 60
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A.1.3 Military Exit Parameter
Most servicemen leave the military after four to six years of military service. The
model’s basic structure, however, is unable to fully capture this behavior. Conse-
quently, a non-pecuniary utility parameter was added to the non-military reward
functions of men who are currently in the military and have four or more years
of military experience. The utility parameter, which varies according to a ser-
viceman’s military experience, incentivizes servicemen with four or more years of
military experience to leave the military. The military exit parameter takes the
following form:
βm = d
m
a−1(β4,m1χma =4 + β5,m1χma =5 + β6,m16≤χma )
A.1.4 Reward Functions
The model has six reward functions. The civilian sector reward function takes the
following form:
Rc(Sa) = w
c
a + β6,c112≤ga + β7,c116≤ga
+ β8,cd
c
a−1 + (1− dca−1)
∑
j
βj1ja + βm + pension
where β6,c and β7,c are parameters that capture the non-pecuniary utilities associ-
ated with possessing a high school diploma or college degree, respectively.
Since choices persist in the data, adding persistence parameters to the reward
functions aids in model fit. Persistence parameters were added to all reward func-
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tions except the schooling reward function. For the civilian reward function, β8,c is
the persistence parameter.
Several parameters were added to the schooling reward function. The school-
ing re-entry parameter was separated into two parameters (β9,s and β10,s), which
allows the re-entry cost to vary by the type of schooling the man is re-entering.
To capture racial differences in school attendance that are present in the data, a
racial parameter β4,s was added. School attendance behavior at age 18 and 19 is
very different than school attendance behavior at age 20 and beyond. This differ-
ence arises because at ages 18 and 19 many men are transitioning between high
school, college, and other sectors. To address school attendance behavior trends,
four parameters (β5,s,β6,s,β7,s,β8,s,) were added to the schooling reward function.
With these additions, the schooling reward function is given by:
Rs(Sa) = β0,s + β1,s112≤ga<16 + β2,s116≤ga + β3,s1a=20112≤ga + β4,s1blk=1
+ 112≤ga · (β5,s1a=18 + β6,s1a>20(a− 20)) + 1ga<12 · (β7,s1a=18 + β8,s1a=19)
+ 118<a · (1− dsa−1) · (β9,s1ga=12 + β10,s113≤ga≤15) + βm + εsa
Several parameters were also added to the home reward function. Parameters
β1,h and β2,h capture non-pecuniary utilities associated with possessing a high school
diploma or college degree. To capture racial differences in home sector participation
that are present in the data, a racial parameter β9,h was added. A school to home
transition parameter β4,h helps the model to draw men transitioning from school
into the home sector. To fit the declining home participation trend, which does
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not decrease linearly, four parameters (β5,h,β6,h,β7,h,β8,h,) were introduced to the
home reward function. With these additions, the home reward function takes the
following form:
Rh(Sa) = β0,h + β1,h112≤ga + β2,h116≤ga
+ β3,hd
h
a−1 + β4,h118<ad
s
a−1 + β5,h1a=18 + β6,h119≤a≤20
+ β7,h121≤a≤22 + β8,h123≤a≤24 + β9,h1blk=1 + βm + pension+ εha
Except for persistence terms and an age 18 parameter for staying home and
serving in the reserves, the military reward functions are unchanged:
Rat(Sa) = βat + w
at
a + β3,atd
at
a−1
Rcr(Sa) = R
c
a + βcr + w
r
a + β3,crd
cr
a−1
Rhr(Sa) = R
h
a + βhr + w
r
a + β3,hr1a=18 + β4,hrd
hr
a−1
A.2 Data
When gathering data, it became apparent that most variables could not be taken
directly from the NLSY79 and therefore needed construction. There are several
reasons this occurred. First, the NLSY79 data are collected over varying time hori-
zons. For example, wages are reported by calendar year while military participation
is reported by interview period. Consequently, the NLSY79 data do not often align
with the model’s decision period. Second, NLSY79 does not always contain data
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that maps directly to variables of interest for the model. For example, the NLSY79
does not contain a variable that map directly to the model’s choice set. Finally,
state space considerations sometimes required condensing the NLSY79 variables.
This section describes how variables were constructed.
A.2.1 The Choice Variable
The following hierarchical order was used to construct the choice variable. The evo-
lution of civilian experience, military experience, and education attainment follows
from the choice variable.
Military Service
NLSY79 respondents are asked each interview whether they have joined the mili-
tary since their last interview. If a respondent indicates that he joined the military
since his last interview, information is then gathered regarding the month joined,
year joined, and service branch. This information reveals in what decision period
the respondent joined the military and what duty type he served.
If a respondent’s enlistment month or enlistment year was not reported, it is un-
clear in which decision period the man joined the military. Therefore, if enlistment
month or enlistment year was not reported, then it was assumed that enlistment
occurred sometime between the interview date and the previous July 1.
A respondent’s ability to participate in other sectors while in the military de-
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pends on his duty type. If the respondent served active duty, then he cannot
participate in any other sector. However, if the respondent served reserve duty, he
must also participate in either the civilian or home sector.
School Attendance
The NLSY79 contains a variable that indicates a respondent’s grade level as of May
1 each year. If a respondent’s grade level rose according to the proceeding value
of this variable and he did not serve active duty military, then the respondent was
recorded as having attended school.
Civilian Sector Participation
NLSY79 respondents are asked for their weekly civilian work hours. If a respondent
did not serve active duty, did not attend school, and worked in the civilian sector
an average of at least 20 hours during the decision period, then the respondent was
said to have participated in the civilian sector.
To determine whether a respondent worked in the civilian sector an average of at
least 20 hours during the decision period, reported hours worked was averaged for
certain weeks during the first and second quarters of the current calendar year and
the fourth quarter of the previous calendar year. The third quarter of the previous
calendar year was omitted from the averaging in an effort to exclude students’
summer employment from the choice construction process. The first, seventh, and
thirteenth weeks of a quarter were used to gather the quarter’s work information.
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This is as in Keane & Wolpin (1997).
Home Sector Participation
If a respondent did not serve active duty, did not attend school, and did not par-
ticipate in the civilian sector, then the respondent was said to have stayed home.
A.2.2 Other Variables
The variables for age and race were taken directly from the NLSY79. All other
variables were to some extent constructed from the NLSY79 data. The following
paragraphs describe how the other variables were constructed. For the variables
described below that are censored, the censoring occurred after the choice variable
was constructed.
Pay Grade
There were three challenges when constructing the military pay grade variable.
The first challenge involved the inclusion of officers. Only 31 men in the sample
become commissioned officers and five men in the sample become warrant officers.
Furthermore, including commissioned and warrant officer pay grades in the model
would expand the state space to a computationally unmanageable size. Given
the lack of officers in the data and the computational complexity associated with
including officer pay grades in the model, it was decided to exclude commissioned
and warrant officers from the analysis sample.
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The second pay grade construction challenge involved the lowest enlisted pay
grade E1. Most servicemen hold a pay grade of E1 during the first four months of
service (i.e., during basic training) and are then promoted. At the end of the first
decision period most servicemen hold the pay grade of E2. Promotion at all other
pay grades, however, usually takes at least a year. To make pay grade promotion
take at least a year at all pay grades, E1 and E2 were combined into one pay grade
in the state space.
The third pay grade construction challenge involved the highest enlisted pay
grades E8 and E9. Due to both data and promotion attrition, only 16 servicemen
in the data reach the pay grade of E8 or E9. Given how few men attain E8 or E9,
it was decided to lessen the model’s computational burden by collapsing pay grades
E8 and E9 into E7 in the state space.
Civilian Experience
Civilian wages are an increasing but concave function of civilian experience. Conse-
quently, men with high levels of civilian experience do not see large increases in their
civilian wages as they accumulate more civilian experience. Taking advantage of
this fact, the state space does not allow individuals to possess more than 20 years
of civilian experience. Men with 20 years of civilian experience can work in the
civilian sector in the model but cannot accumulate additional civilian experience.
This configuration decreases the state space by 32%.
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Military Experience
When constructing the active duty and reserve duty experience variables, it was
revealed that 35 men in the data serve both active duty and reserve duty. To
accommodate these 35 people, it would have been necessary for the state space
at any level of military experience to include all possible combinations of active
duty and reserve duty experience that sum up to that level of military experience.
For example, a man with two years of military experience could have two years of
active duty experience, a year of active duty experience and a year of reserve duty
experience, or two years of reserve duty experience. Allowing for all possible military
experience combinations expands the state space by over 800%. Additionally, men
who served both military duty types often reported spending only one year in one
of the duty types. For these reasons it was decided to drop the 35 men who serve
both active duty and reserve duty from the analysis sample.
Education Attainment
When constructing the education attainment variable, it was decided to ease the
model’s computational burden by collapsing some of the education attainment
state space. As a function of education attainment, civilian wages for high school
dropouts who have not completed the eleventh grade are low and not widely dis-
tributed. Therefore, all grade levels below the eleventh grade (high school sopho-
mores and below) were collapsed into one grade level. Additionally, since relatively
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few men attend graduate school, grade levels seventeen and up (graduate school)
were collapsed into one grade level. Men with a year of graduate education can
attend school in the model but cannot accumulate more education. Grade levels
eleven (high school junior) through sixteen (college senior) were unchanged.
AFQT Quartile Score
AFQT scores are reported on a 1 to 100 scale in the data. The score value represents
an individual’s AFQT percentile ranking. The AFQT quartile score variable was
constructed by sorting AFQT scores and then assigning each score to a quartile.
Due to state space concerns, it was decided to not include AFQT quartile score
in the state space directly. Rather, a new variable was constructed using school-
ing attainment, which is in the state space, and AFQT quartile score to indicate
whether a man is possibly ineligible for military service. The presence of the mili-
tary ineligibility variable in the state space allows each man to properly weight the
discounted expectation of the next decision period’s value function.
In addition to the military ineligibility variable, AFQT quartile score indirectly
enters the state space through the endowment type distibution. The probability of
being a certain type is conditioned on AFQT quartile score. Endowments, therefore,
are a function of AFQT quartile score.
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Wages
Civilian and military wages also needed construction. During each NLSY79 inter-
view, respondents were asked to report their civilian and military wages during the
past calendar year. It was from these wage reports that decision period wages were
constructed. To align the reported wages with the decision period, wages from the
two calendar years included in the decision year were each weighted by half and
then summed. Reported wages were also transformed into real values during wage
construction with 1982-1984 as the base year.
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Age Civilian School Home Active Reserves Total
18
739 1,123 938 65 31 2,896
25.52% 38.78% 32.39% 2.24% 1.07% 100.0%
19
1,047 911 725 122 44 2,849
36.75% 31.98% 25.45% 4.28% 1.55% 100.0%
20
1,231 761 641 132 44 2,809
43.82% 27.09% 22.82% 4.70% 1.56% 100.0%
21
1,376 620 583 132 44 2,755
49.95% 22.50% 21.16% 4.79% 1.60% 100.0%
22
1,535 401 593 113 43 2,685
57.17% 14.93% 22.09% 4.21% 1.61% 100.0%
23
1,689 250 533 93 38 2,603
64.89% 9.60% 20.48% 3.57% 1.46% 100.0%
24
1,823 158 442 77 34 2,534
71.94% 6.24% 17.44% 3.04% 1.34% 100.0%
25
1,836 136 401 61 28 2,462
74.57% 5.52% 16.29% 2.48% 1.13% 100.0%
26
1,865 109 359 51 21 2,405
77.55% 4.53% 14.93% 2.12% 0.87% 100.0%
27
1,853 92 332 38 17 2,332
79.46% 3.95% 14.24% 1.63% 0.73% 100.0%
28
1,847 67 327 29 17 2,287
80.76% 2.93% 14.30% 1.27% 0.74% 100.0%
29
1,828 45 319 23 15 2,230
81.97% 2.02% 14.30% 1.03% 0.67% 100.0%
30
1,816 31 303 21 13 2,184
83.15% 1.42% 13.87% 0.96% 0.59% 100.0%
35
1,716 2 228 14 8 1,968
87.20% 0.10% 11.59% 0.71% 0.41% 100.0%
40
1,509 0 235 8 4 1,756
85.93% 0.00% 13.38% 0.46% 0.23% 100.0%
45
470 0 82 1 1 554
84.84% 0.00% 14.80% 0.18% 0.18% 100.0%
Table A.2: Choice Distribution by Age
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Previous Civilian School Home Active Reserves
Civilian (91.01%) (1.48%) (7.36%) (1.05%) (0.04%)
School (29.53%) (51.50%) (17.36%) (1.22%) (0.38%)
Home (39.67%) (5.83%) (53.86%) (0.54%) (0.11%)
A. Duty (4.56%) (1.24%) (9.32%) (84.89%) (0.00%)
Reserves (8.84%) (0.86%) (3.66%) (0.00%) (86.64%)
Table A.3: Choice Transitions
Age White Black All Races
18
1,429 145 1,574
55.93% 42.52% 54.35%
19
1,971 206 2,177
78.43% 61.31% 76.41%
20+
40,153 4,475 44,628
86.27% 74.6% 84.94%
Table A.4: High School Diploma Status by Race
Age No Diploma Diploma Total
18
41 55 96
42.71% 57.29% 100.0%
19
11 74 85
12.94% 87.06% 100.0%
20+
11 94 105
10.48% 89.52% 100.0%
Table A.5: High School Diploma Status at Time of Enlistment
95
Sample Over Sample
Age
Civilian Active Reserve Civilian Active
Military Military Military
18 7,153.11 6,156.75 2,233.64 - 6,117.26
19 8,832.92 7,184.61 3,040.87 - 7,422.49
20 10,280.76 8,399.40 3,653.49 8,331.65 8,406.22
21 11,322.16 9,131.34 5,373.45 8,509.36 9,011.74
22 12,560.37 10,050.14 5,749.10 9,879.81 9,802.84
23 14,054.18 11,243.08 4,470.95 11,498.77 11,039.10
24 15,366.36 12,300.39 5,539.79 12,586.34 12,194.55
27 19,403.44 14,108.73 7,195.46 17,536.24 14,786.11
30 22,150.33 17,097.70 7,753.90 20,330.71 17,363.51
35 25,574.28 20,223.08 11,740.38 20,379.26 21,366.18
45 27,646.46 - - 25,222.95 -
Notes: Ages with less than ten observations not reported. In 1982-1984 dollars.
Table A.6: Mean Wage by Age
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Age Civilian School Home Active Reserves
18
25.48% 42.59% 28.85% 2.10% 0.98 %
(25.52%) (38.78%) (32.39%) (2.24%) (1.07%)
19
39.91% 30.11% 25.29% 3.64% 1.05%
(36.75%) (31.98%) (25.45%) (4.28%) (1.55%)
20
48.50% 24.00% 22.22% 4.21% 1.07%
(43.82%) (27.09%) (22.82%) (4.70%) (1.56%)
21
51.79% 21.83% 21.07% 4.18% 1.13%
(49.95%) (22.50%) (21.16%) (4.79%) (1.60%)
22
59.53% 15.89% 19.35% 4.09% 1.14%
(57.17%) (14.93%) (22.09%) (4.21%) (1.61%)
23
65.20% 10.26% 19.58% 3.62% 1.34%
(64.89%) (9.60%) (20.48%) (3.57%) (1.46%)
24
70.51% 5.71% 18.92% 3.30% 1.56%
(71.94%) (6.24%) (17.44%) (3.04%) (1.34%)
25
72.75% 4.90% 18.36% 2.78% 1.21%
(74.57%) (5.52%) (16.29%) (2.48%) (1.14%)
26
74.80% 3.92% 17.93% 2.45% 0.91 %
(77.55%) (4.53%) (14.93%) (2.12%) (0.87%)
27
77.89% 3.17% 16.06% 2.21% 0.67%
(79.46%) (3.95%) (14.24%) (1.63%) (0.73%)
28
79.63% 3.00% 14.93% 2.00% 0.43%
(80.76%) (2.93%) (14.30%) (1.27%) (0.74%)
29
81.02% 2.52% 14.46% 1.76% 0.23%
(81.97%) (2.02%) (14.30%) (1.03%) (0.67%)
30
84.90% 0.00% 13.36% 1.62% 0.12%
(83.15%) (1.42%) (13.87%) (0.96%) (0.59%)
35
87.18% 0.00% 11.74% 1.07% 0.01%
(87.20%) (0.10%) (11.59%) (0.71%) (0.41%)
40
87.95% 0.00% 11.25% 0.80% 0.00%
(85.93%) (0.00%) (13.38%) (0.46%) (0.23%)
45
87.57% 0.00% 11.83% 0.60% 0.00%
(84.84%) (0.00%) (14.80%) (0.18%) (0.18%)
Note: Actual percentages in parentheses.
Table A.7: Simulated Choice Distribution by Age
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Age Civilian School Home Military Statistic
18 1.16 -105.25 108.57 6.90 22.76***
19 -86.37 54.90 4.57 36.14 18.49***
20 138.24 -81.65 -16.63 -25.25 29.43***
21 51.61 -18.18 -2.47 -27.08 7.75*
22 64.66 26.59 -68.81 -15.01 14.86***
23 8.09 17.76 -22.90 -1.81 2.26
24 -35.87 -12.84 39.05 12.81 6.28*
25 -44.26 -14.37 54.07 9.83 10.55**
26 -64.95 -13.64 78.96 9.43 19.60***
27 -36.25 -16.26 45.05 14.23 13.54 ***
28 -25.66 1.62 14.72 10.55 2.45
29 -21.06 12.43 3.59 6.99 3.89
30 38.62 -0.08 -10.93 4.39 64.00***
35 -0.39 -0.05 2.97 -0.77 3.50
40 35.88 0.00 -34.25 2.08 7.42*
45 15.36 0.00 -14.68 1.70 4.77
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Table A.8: Choice Distribution Goodness of Fit: Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic
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Previous Civil. School Home Active Reserves
Civilian
93.15% 1.28% 5.51% 0.02% 0.05%
(91.01%) (1.48%) (7.36%) (1.05%) (0.04%)
School
35.55% 51.29% 11.88% 0.94% 0.34%
(29.53%) (51.50%) (17.36%) (1.22%) (0.38%)
Home
35.06% 1.84% 62.44% 0.43% 0.22%
(39.67%) (5.83%) (53.86%) (0.54%) (0.11%)
A. Duty
4.31% 1.63% 5.42% 88.64% 0.00%
(4.56%) (1.24%) (9.32%) (84.89%) (0.00%)
Reserves
18.33% 1.53% 1.05% 0.00% 79.08%
(8.84%) (0.86%) (3.66%) (0.00%) (86.64%)
Note: Actual percentages in parentheses.
Table A.9: Simulated Choice Transitions
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Race Data Simulation
Participation Whites 9.24% 9.36%
Rate Blacks 12.32% 12.22%
All 9.6% 9.70%
Career Whites 5.36 5.84
Length Blacks 5.60 7.75
All 5.36 6.12
Note: Career length in years.
Table A.10: Military Participation & Career Length
Data Simulation
Wage Observations Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Civilian 28,853 19,842.94 12,847.77 20,400.22 10,423.03
Active Duty 2,939 10,702.83 4,519.75 10,913.88 4,565.76
Reserve Duty 371 5,760.44 6,510.40 8,522.87 5,911.11
Note: In 1982-1984 dollars.
Table A.11: Actual and Predicted Wages
Data Simulation
Quartile 1 13.11% 11.76%
Quartile 2 27.34% 27.55%
Quartile 3 37.45% 29.88%
Quartile 4 22.10% 30.81%
Table A.12: AFQT Quartile Score Distribution for Military Participants
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Good State Severe State
Search Cost 0 -635.20
Good State 65.5% 34.5%
Severe State 40.3% 59.7%
Note: Search Cost in 1982-1984 dollars.
Table A.13: Business Cycle States
White Black
AFQT/Diploma T1 T2 T3 T4 T1 T2 T3 T4
Q1/No Diploma 0.45 0.24 0.29 0.02 0.32 0.40 0.26 0.02
Q2/No Diploma 0.41 0.15 0.32 0.12 0.31 0.27 0.31 0.12
Q3/No Diploma 0.46 0.05 0.30 0.18 0.38 0.11 0.32 0.19
Q4/No Diploma 0.36 0.06 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.12 0.28 0.31
Q1/Diploma 0.56 0.15 0.27 0.02 0.44 0.27 0.27 0.02
Q2/Diploma 0.49 0.09 0.29 0.14 0.39 0.16 0.30 0.15
Q3/Diploma 0.51 0.03 0.26 0.20 0.44 0.06 0.28 0.22
Q4/Diploma 0.40 0.03 0.24 0.33 0.33 0.07 0.25 0.36
Table A.14: Estimated Type Probabilities
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Age Civilian School Home Active Reserves Total
18 29.31 42.31 26.57 1.26 0.56 100
19 46.56 28.88 22.09 1.92 0.55 100
20 56.34 22.38 18.67 2.11 0.50 100
21 60.63 19.94 16.93 1.97 0.51 100
22 69.10 14.22 14.45 1.85 0.38 100
23 74.88 8.67 14.47 1.57 0.40 100
24 79.94 4.68 13.45 1.39 0.54 100
27 86.17 2.79 9.93 0.88 0.22 100
30 92.01 0.00 7.32 0.66 0.00 100
35 93.83 0.00 5.77 0.40 0.00 100
45 93.95 0.00 5.86 0.18 0.00 100
Table A.15: Type One Choice Distribution by Age
Age Civilian School Home Active Reserves Total
18 20.21 25.37 52.92 0.22 1.27 100
19 29.29 12.15 56.70 0.41 1.73 100
20 35.27 6.40 56.56 0.29 1.47 100
21 35.49 4.44 58.39 0.19 1.48 100
22 35.97 3.46 59.05 0.16 1.58 100
23 35.31 2.40 61.13 0.05 1.11 100
24 35.77 1.04 62.24 0.02 0.92 100
27 37.33 0.97 61.49 0.00 0.21 100
30 40.44 0.00 59.53 0.00 0.03 100
35 43.88 0.00 56.11 0.00 0.01 100
45 42.94 0.00 57.06 0.00 0.00 100
Table A.16: Type Two Choice Distribution by Age
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Age Civilian School Home Active Reserves Total
18 25.87 39.61 28.70 5.64 0.18 100
19 40.16 25.93 23.47 10.19 0.25 100
20 49.00 19.17 19.53 12.03 0.27 100
21 52.20 16.80 18.52 12.19 0.30 100
22 58.80 12.11 16.74 12.05 0.30 100
23 63.58 7.98 17.33 10.82 0.29 100
24 68.49 4.36 16.89 9.93 0.32 100
27 75.11 3.51 14.58 6.74 0.06 100
30 83.36 0.00 11.73 4.91 0.00 100
35 86.35 0.00 10.36 3.29 0.00 100
45 88.24 0.00 9.86 1.90 0.00 100
Table A.17: Type Three Choice Distribution by Age
Age Civilian School Home Active Reserves Total
18 19.06 57.58 20.41 0.00 2.94 100
19 30.21 49.53 17.10 0.00 3.15 100
20 37.17 45.07 14.45 0.00 3.31 100
21 40.03 43.66 12.74 0.00 3.57 100
22 51.98 32.52 11.48 0.00 4.02 100
23 62.36 21.83 10.62 0.00 5.18 100
24 71.66 12.78 9.42 0.00 6.14 100
27 86.20 4.82 6.05 0.00 5.56 100
30 96.41 0.00 2.93 0.00 0.65 100
35 98.08 0.00 1.88 0.00 0.05 100
45 97.71 0.00 2.29 0.00 0.00 100
Table A.18: Type Four Choice Distribution by Age
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Name Symbol Value Standard
Error
Civilian Wage Shock S.D. σc 0.1588 4.53E-07
Schooling Shock S.D. σs 17,240.2 239.04
Stay Home Shock S.D. σh 20,952.2 59.78
Active Wage Shock S.D. σat 0.2771 2.74E-05
Reserve Wage Shock S.D. σr 0.4877 1.38E-04
Civilian/School Corr. ρcs 0.7256 1.19E-05
Civilian/Home Corr. ρch 0.0129 6.14E-08
Civilian/Active Corr. ρcat 0.6042 1.76E-04
Civilian/Reserve Corr. ρcr 0.5785 7.86E-04
School/Home Corr. ρsh 0.0788 1.08E-06
School/Active Corr. ρsat 0.2491 8.14E-05
School/Reserve Corr. ρsr 0.2351 3.72E-04
Home/Active Corr. ρhat 0.2824 8.13E-05
Home/Reserve Corr. ρhr -0.0848 8.15E-05
Active/Reserve Corr. ρatr 0.7345 1.11E-03
C. Wage Measurement Error σµc 0.3367 2.08E-07
A. Wage Measurement Error σµa 0.2334 2.54E-06
R. Wage Measurement Error σµr 0.7962 6.63E-05
Military Rejection Prob. pid 0.0025 0.41
Military Rejection Prob. pim 0.0013 9.76E-02
Discount Factor δ 0.72 2.61E-06
Table A.21: Variance and Probability Parameters
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Name Symbol Value Standard
Error
Civilian Rental Rate rc 8,973.22 16.42
Active Rental Rate rat 0.8295
Reserve Rental Rate rr 0.2031
Black C. Rental Rate βb,c -0.1145 2.89E-05
C. Schooling Return β1,c 0.0876 7.41E-08
C. Civilian Exp. Return β2,c 0.1068 6.25E-08
C. Military Exp. Return β3,c 0.0276 2.36E-07
C. Civilian Exp. Sq. Return β4,c -0.0011 1.61E-10
C. Civilian/Military Return β5,c -0.0019 5.91E-09
A. Pay Grade Return β1,at 0.1431 4.17E-06
A. Military Exp. Return β2,at -0.0265 2.02E-07
R. Pay Grade Return β1,r 0.2722 6.65E-05
R. Military Exp. Return β2,r -0.0548 3.53E-06
C. H.S. Diploma Reward β6,c -1,070.0 5.57
C. College Degree Reward β7,c 7,942.0 39.99
C. Persistence Reward β8,c 878.4 3.63
C. Sector Search Cost βj -635.0 219.86
Base Pay Constant β0,b 5,547.22 91.33
B.P. Pay Grade Return β1,b 1,142.27 22.41
B.P. Experience Return β2,b 317.35 5.14
Table A.22: Wage, Civilian Sector, and Base Pay Parameters
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Name Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Logit Constant Term
- -0.6302 -0.4491 -3.157
(-) (1.36E-02) (6.15E-03) (3.50E-02)
Logit H.S. Diploma
- -0.7136 -0.2636 -0.0026
(-) (1.87E-02) (5.77E-03) (1.29E-02)
Logit Black Indicator
- 0.862 0.2367 0.2706
(-) (9.68E-02) (8.88E-02) (0.20)
Logit AFQT 2 Quartile
- -0.3927 0.1910 1.914
(-) (1.97E-02) (1.04E-02) (3.55E-02)
Logit AFQT 3 Quartile
- -1.499 0.0319 2.208
(-) (3.74E-02) (3.19E-03) (2.63E-02)
Logit AFQT 4 Quartile
- -1.108 0.2045 2.986
(-) (2.05E-02) (9.24E-03) (2.99E-02)
Civil. Skill Endowment
- -0.9517 -0.4170 0.4536
(-) (2.02E-06) (9.09E-07) (3.49E-06)
S. Preference Endowment
9,128 - 4,374 21,900
(1306.53) (-) (877.48) (703.84)
H. Preference Endowment
3,473 11,400 - 10,100
(115.24) (2183.21) (-) (239.75)
A. Duty Skill Endowment
0.3741 -1.030 0.1033 -
(8.47E-05) (6.63E-05) (3.14E-05) (-)
Table A.23: Type Parameters
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Name Symbol Value Standard
Error
School Constant β0,s -29,670 537.74
College Cost β1,s 32,160 1,452.76
Graduate School Cost β2,s 41,920 2,052.57
College Age 20 Cost β3,s 1,001 834.92
School Black Constant β10,s -1,105 4,173
College Age 18 Cost β5,s -8,256 26,604
College Time Cost β6,s -3,997 181.25
H.S. Age 18 Subsidy β7,s 27,140 16,677
H.S. Age 19 Subsidy β8,s 16,980 12,415
College Return Cost β9,s -26,770 951.51
College Return Cost β10,s -17,030 956.79
Home Constant β0,h -16,500 47.28
Home H.S. Diploma Reward β1,h -1,442 30.03
Home College Reward β2,h 10,840 168.58
Home Persistence β3,h 29,980 361.10
Home School Transition Reward β4,h 9,640 952.20
Home Age 18 β5,h 16,700 5,718
Home Age 19-20 β6,h -2,791 682.07
Home Age 21-22 β7,h -1,282 575.45
Home Age 23-24 β8,h -419.03 880.33
Home Black Constant β9,h -167.5 1,747
Table A.24: School and Home Sector Parameters
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Name Symbol Value Standard
Error
Active Duty Non-Pecuniary βat 17.92 24.68
Active Duty Persistence β5,at 733.2 24.00
R. and W. Non-Pecuniary βcr -5,892 1,071
R. and W. Persistence β3,cr 3,540 597.63
R. and H. Non-Pecuniary βhr -3,749 705.76
R. and H. Age 18 β3,hr 796.0 855.66
R. and H. Persistence β4,hr 2,345 380.66
M. Exit Reward Year 4 β4,m 1,212 552.99
M. Exit Reward Year 5 β5,m 1,582 1,967
M. Exit Reward Year 6+ β6,m 1,974 3.63
Table A.25: Military Sector Parameters
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Figure A.1: Real Military Spending 1947-2004
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Figure A.2: Active Duty Military Size 1950-2007
Figure A.3: 2007 Enlisted Rank Distribution
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Figure A.4: Military Deaths by Deployment 1980-2000
Figure A.5: Unemployment Rate 1950-2007
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Figure A.6: 1988-1998 24-Month Attrition Rate by Education Status
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